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Late in 1963, an oil boom got underway in Morrow County,
Ohio, that was reminiscent of the final years of the 19th century,
when Ohio was one of the nation's leading oil producers, supplying
in one year (1896) more than one-third of all the oil produced in
the country.'
In 1964, 2665 new wells were drilled in 70 of the 88 counties in
the state; 1106 of these wells secured production, for a successful
completion average of 41.5 per cent; production was obtained in
41 counties. In Morrow County alone, 1342 wells were drilled, 431
of which secured production. Crude oil production increased to
15,580,000 barrels per year, putting Ohio 17th among oil producing
states, and 37,713 million cubic feet of gas were produced, placing
the state in 15th position among gas producing states 2
Also reminiscent of the 19th century was the 1963 status of
Ohio's petroleum conservation laws. Such laws were virtually
nonexistent. Until March of 1964 there were no well-spacing regu-
lations in the state at all, and when instituted in that month, the
regulations merely restricted drilling to 10-acre drill sites. Town-lot
drilling was a common practice.3
Happily, in 1965 the Ohio Legislature adopted a conservation
law that provides the authority and means to accomplish effective
petroleum conservation.m 4 While we shall have occasion to criticize
some of its details, the act in general makes a number of positive
contributions to the cause of oil and gas conservation. It establishes
a regulatory commission which is indirectly empowered to prevent
waste, and is directly authorized to regulate drilling, to establish
state-wide well-spacing rules as well as special field rules (both
without statutory limits on the size of drilling units) and to compel
pooling and unitization.
* Professor of Law, Stanford University.
**Professor of Law, Stanford University.
1 Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm'n, Oil and Gas Law in Ohio, Staff Research
Report No. 63, at 12 (1965). [Hereinafter cited as Staff Research Report].
2 XXIV Oil and Gas Compact Bull. 62-63 (1965). The bulletin gives the suc-
cessful completion average as 45.25%, but this appears as a mistake from the figures
given.
3 Id. at 63.
4 Chapter 1509 of the Ohio Revised Code, signed by the Governor July 16, 1965,
and effective 90 days from that date. The act was based on Sub. H.B. No. 234,
introduced by an ad hoc legislative committee chaired by Representative Armstrong.
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It is the purpose of this article to examine the substantive
provisions of the statute in some detail and to comment more
generally on the administrative structure and procedure for imple-
menting and enforcing the conservation regime.
I. THE REGULATORY COMMISSION
The act creates a Division of Oil and Gas within the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources5 and delegates to the chief of the division
the power and duty to enforce the provisions of the act and to make
additional rules for its administration and implementation.! The
chief has the principal responsibility for administering the conser-
vation law, but two other agencies are delegated some power
in connection therewith. One of these, the Technical Advisory
Council on Oil and Gas, has no rule-making, adjudicating, or en-
forcement powers, except with respect to well-spacing. Its main
function is to advise the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas,
although it may participate in whatever hearings the chief may
hold and the chief may delegate to it some of his statutory powers.
In two instances, the Technical Advisory Council has independent
power of its own: it must approve both state-wide well-spacing
orderss and special well-spacing orders applicable to particular
reservoirs.9 Since this veto power over well-spacing orders is im-
portant, we will pause to examine the composition of the Technical
Advisory Council. It has seven members, appointed by the Governor
and approved by the senate. Three members are to be independents
operating primarily in Ohio; three more are to represent- operators
with substantial Ohio interests but who also have substantial
interests in at least one other state. The seventh member is to
represent the public. All but the latter must have had a minimum
of five years of practical or technical experience in the industry and
none of these six may represent more than one company or operator.
Office terms are three years long and are staggered. 10
How the council will discharge its important duty of review
and approval of spacing orders is subject to speculation. Much will
depend, of course, on the identity of its members, but the design
seems to give some power to independent operators who, on the
basis of past history, may be expected to favor denser spacing
5 Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 1509.02 (Page Supp. 1965) [Hereinafter cited by the
section].
6 Section 1509.03.
7 Section 1509.38.
8 Section 1509.24.
V Section 1509.25.
10 Section 1509.38.
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than major operators ordinarily desire. On the other hand, except
possibly for the public member, no representation is given to land-
owners, who are the most vigorous proponents of intensive drilling.
One may be permitted to hope for-perhaps even expect-a sensible
spacing policy based on the area that can be efficiently drained by
a single well. One could have been surer of such a policy had not
the legislature deleted from the bill the provision adopting efficient
drainage as the spacing standard. 1
In addition to the Technical Advisory Council, the act creates
an Oil and Gas Board of Review of five members appointed by the
Governor (without concurrence of the senate) for staggered terms
of five years. One member is to represent the major companies,
one the independent companies, one is to be "learned and experi-
enced in oil and gas law" (presumably a licensed lawyer since
experience is required), one a geologist, and one a person "who, by
reason of his previous vocation, employment, or affiliations, can be
classed as a representative of the public"--a vague classification
which might stump even a sociologist but which may in practice
turn out to be a deserving public servant whose worth went unap-
preciated at the polls. Not more than three can be members of the
same political party. 2 The board hears appeals from orders of the
Chief of Division of Oil and Gas.
It may be a formidable job to obtain qualified men for the
board as the statute places the niggardly limit of 20 dollars a day
on their compensation. 3 It is regrettable that membership on the
board was not made more attractive, for with the proper personnel
it could have had an influence on the regulatory process. The
powers of the board are broad, for it can enter the orders that
it finds the Chief of the Oil and Gas Division should have entered. 14
With this kind of power and with the expertise that the statutory
qualifications contemplate, the board might have become the pre-
ferred avenue of appeal, thus serving as a knowledgeable check on
the Chief of the Oil and Gas Division and relieving the inexpert
courts of much of the burden of overseeing the work of the division.
Perhaps this may still prove to be the case, as public-spirited,
disinterested-yet-qualified citizens come forward to volunteer their
services. We, however, are inclined to the view that you get what
you pay for.
11 Section 1509.22 of the draft version of the bill provided: "The size of the
drilling units shall not be smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and
economically drained by one well...."
12 The organization of the board is set forth in § 1509.35.
13 Section 1509.35. This is down $5.00 from the rate of pay set by the draft bill.
14 Section 1509.36.
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With this brief introduction to the regulatory agency, we turn
now to an examination of the substantive provisions of the statute,
after which we will consider administrative procedures (including
appeals). The article concludes with some comments on deficiencies
in the act and some suggestions for improvement on it.
II. SUBSTANTIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. General
The definitions section of the statute defines waste fairly
broadly to include physical waste ("as such term is generally
understood in the oil and gas industry"), waste of reservoir energy,
inefficient storage of petroleum, and drilling and operation of wells
so that the amount of hydrocarbons ultimately recoverable by
prudent operation is reduced.15
Curiously, the statute has no provision explicitly granting
power to the Chief of the Oil and Gas Division to make rules for
the prevention of waste. It would appear, however, that a back-
handed grant of power is made in section 1509.20, which requires
operators to use "every reasonable precaution in accordance with
the most approved methods of operation to stop and prevent waste
* .. ." Since the chief has power to make rules and regulations to
implement and enforce the statute, 6 he can, we believe, promulgate
regulations specifying particular duties created by section 1509.20.
The only substantive limitations on this power are those inherent
in the statutory definition of waste, those inherent in the statutory
duty to use "the most approved methods of operation,"'17 and those
set forth in specific provisions elsewhere in the statute. The first
two limitations have minor significance, since waste is broadly
defined and since the duty of operators to prevent waste is measured
by a rigorous standard of "most approved methods." There are, how-
ever, a number of specific statutory provisions governing operations,
and they, of course, override the chief's rule-making power. For
example, the statute expressly permits the flaring of casinghead
gas where there is "no economic market at the well for the escaping
gas."'" This is an unfortunate provision, for it deprives the agency
of the ability to use shut-down orders to force gas connections to
a field, a device that agencies in other states have successfully
employed.'9
15 Section 1509.01(H).
16 Section 1509.03.
17 Section 150920.
18 Ibid.
'9 The Texas Railroad Commission has waged a vigorous fight to prevent the
flaring of casinghead gas. For example, in the Spraberry Field the commission shut
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In addition to prohibiting waste, the statute prohibits pollution
of surface and ground water by oil and gas operations and delegates
rule-making power to the chief to accomplish this objective. Sim-
ilarly, the chief is authorized to promulgate safety rules to safeguard
against hazards to life, limb, and property.
B. Drilling permits
Drilling permits from the chief are required for drilling a new
well, deepening an existing well, reopening a well, or plugging back
a well to a different source of supply20 Applications for permits are
required to contain the information one would expect for the pur-
pose, the only unusual requirement being that of supplying the
names and addresses of royalty owners.21 A surety bond must be
posted before the permit can issue.2 Owing to the prevalence of coal
mining in Ohio, the statute contains detailed provisions regulating
the drilling of oil and gas wells close to mines. We will not examine
those provisions beyond noting that an oil and gas operator who
drills wells within specified, short distances from coal mines, must
give notice to the mine operator, who is granted an opportunity
to object to the issuance of a permit.23 Completion reports are
required for all wells. 24 In addition, after a six months interval
(allowed presumably to preserve secrecy) electrical, radioactivity,
and geophysical logs run during drilling must be filed with the
division.2 , For wells capable of producing oil or gas, annual pro-
duction reports are required 6
A curious provision is found in section 1509.12: "Unless written
permission is granted by the chief . . ., no owner of any oil well
shall permit said well to stand more than six months without
diligently pumping or flowing same." The purpose would not appear
to be the same as that of the next following provision, requiring the
down all producing wells until the casinghead gas produced from the field could be
put to beneficial use. While this order did not survive attack in the Texas Supreme
Court, Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan Oil Co., 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173, 2 0. &
G.R. 616 (1953), the court left it open to the commission to accomplish the same
result by limiting oil production to the amount that would produce only that volume
of gas for which there was a market. Within five years the commission had accom-
plished its purpose. See Sullivan, Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History-
1958, at 232-235, 237, 243 (1960). See also Jones, The Spraberry Decision, 32 Texas
L. Rev. 730 (1954).
20 Section 1509.05.
21 Section 1509.06(C).
22 Section 1509.07.
23 Section 1509.08.
24 Section 1509.10.
25 Ibid.
26 Section 1509.11.
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plugging of gas wells that have ceased to be productive and have
not been operated for six months. The latter, a familiar requirement,
is aimed at fire hazard from escaping gas and at pollution of sub-
surface strata. The former does not require plugging when the oil
supply is exhausted but seems rather to establish an absolute
statutory duty of operation as a substitute, in this circumstance, for
the common-law duty of prudent operation. Particular sanctions
for the violation of this statutory duty are not prescribed in the act.
Query, whether the chief could obtain a mandatory injunction to
operate the well under section 1509.04, the wording of which seems
to contemplate restraining orders, not affirmative orders to act.
Query further whether the provisions of section 1509.99 imposing
fines for violation of the statute are applicable to the failure to
produce.
In addition to drilling permits, the statute requires a permit
for plugging and abandoning wells, and after plugging, an abandon-
ment report. Supervision of plugging operations by state officials
is contemplated by the statute, which specifies plugging methods
in considerable detail.2 7 Similarly the statute28 contains detailed
provisions on methods of drilling wells through coal mines. One
wonders why the legislature thought it necessary or desirable to
include detailed legislation on a subject that seems readily adopt-
able to treatment by rules issued by the regulatory agency.
C. Well spacing
Two sections of the act relate to this subject, sections 1509.24
and 1509.25. The former authorizes state-wide spacing orders, which
may be issued by the chief upon approval of the Technical Advisory
Council on Oil and Gas. The standard governing the exercise of this
power to establish minimum-sized drilling units is "conserving oil
and gas reserves and the safety of persons."
Section 1509.25 authorizes the issuance of special well-spacing
orders for particular reservoirs. Such orders may be issued, after
notice and hearing, upon the chief's own initiative or upon applica-
tion by an operator. The substantive requirements for the issuance
of the order are:
(1) Findings that the pool can be defined with reasonable cer-
tainty,
(2) Findings that the pool is in "the initial state of development"
(a phrase not defined in the statute),
27 Sections 1509.15-.17, 1509.19.
28 Section 1509.18.
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(3) Findings that departure from the state-wide order under
section 1509.24 is reasonably necessary to protect correlative
rights or to conserve oil and gas, and
(4) Written approval of the Technical Advisory Council on Oil
and Gas.
The order itself must provide for uniform spacing, except for
the discovery well, and other wells already drilled or being drilled.
A draft version of the bill declared that "the size of drilling
units shall not be smaller than the maximum area that can be
efficiently and economically drained by one well . . . ." This pro-
vision does not appear in the act, but its omission does not neces-
sarily prevent the chief from adopting such a standard as the guide-
line for making field rules.
To this point the spacing provisions of the statute are fairly
typical of conservation statutes generally. However, the last para-
graph of section 1509.25 is somewhat mystifying. It provides:
"Nothing in this section shall permit the chief to establish drilling
units in a pool by requiring the use of a survey grid coordinate
system with fixed or established unit boundaries."
If we interpret this provision correctly, it forbids the use of
any grid system, including the United States Government Survey
(which covers much of Ohio), as the basis for establishing drilling
units by special orders directed to particular pools. We can think
of no good reason for such a prohibition. The Report of the Com-
mittee to Study Oil and Gas Laws in Ohio (the Armstrong Commit-
tee) recommended that the statute "allow the administrative agency
to use property lines, government survey lines, or a grid in setting
out the drilling units . ,,. Other states having the United States
Government Survey regularly employ it in spacing orders, and
Texas, which does not have the Survey, uses both private grid
surveys and commission-established grid patterns in its spacing
orders.
Possibly the paragraph is intended to have a narrower meaning.
It could be interpreted to mean that the chief shall not employ a
new grid system but shall make use of existing surveys and property
lines. This interpretation would solve the problem for most of Ohio,
but would leave the Virginia Military District, which has no rec-
tangular survey, outside its provisions. At present, there is little or
no petroleum activity in the latter area.
29 Ohio Legislative Serv. Com'n Report of the Comm. to Study Oil & Gas Laws
in Ohio 3 (1964). The Staff Research Report makes the same recommendation.
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The preferable solution to the problem is to repeal the para-
graph entirely, leaving to the chief the discretion to establish drilling
units by reference to whatever survey lines seem convenient to him.
Wells may be drilled on undersized or irregularly shaped tracts
of land as exceptions to both the state-wide spacing rule and to
special field orders30 For an exception to be granted, the applicant
must show that:
(1) he is unable to enter a voluntary pooling agreement (since
almost anyone can get into a voluntary pooling agreement
upon some kind of terms, we expect the chief and the courts
to construe this clause to contain an implied standard of
reasonableness, so that the requirement is met if the land
cannot be pooled on reasonable terms) ;
(2) he would be unable to participate under a mandatory pooling
order;
(3) he would otherwise be precluded from producing oil and gas
from his tract because of spacing or distance requirements.
The safety valve provided by this section is useful, but we
should not expect it to be invoked often since voluntary and com-
pulsory pooling should take care of most undersized and irregular
tracts. Reduction of the allowable production from such exception
tracts31 should eliminate much of the incentive for seeking excep-
tions.
D. Prorationing
Section 1509.40 would seem to flatly forbid limitations on pro-
duction. In the broadest possible terms the section provides that
"no authority granted in Chapter 1509 of the Revised Code shall
be construed as authorizing a limitation of production of oil or gas
for any reason whatsoever." The only exception is for undersized
tracts to protect correlative rights. Under section 1509.29, an ex-
ception tract is to be permitted to produce that proportion of its
maximum daily potential that its surface acreage bears to the acre-
age in a standard spacing unit, as established by state-wide rule or
special field order. Thus if 40-acre spacing has been ordered for a
field, a 20-acre exception tract will be permitted to produce one-half
of its maximum daily potential. This production allowance may
be further reduced if the exception well is closer to boundary lines
than the spacing order generally permits. In such case, even though
the irregular tract may have the minimum required acreage, pro-
duction is limited to that proportion of its maximum daily potential
30 Section 150929.
31 Ibid. The proration formula prescribed for exception tracts is discussed in the
next section of this article.
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that the distance from the well to the boundary line of the exception
tract bears to the standard distance established in the spacing order
for regular tracts. Thus a spacing order might establish 40-acre
spacing by prescribing 1320 feet between wells and 660 feet between
the well and the boundary line, measured along the shortest line
from the well to the boundary. Such an order would contemplate
one well for every 40 acres, with the well located in the center of
the drilling unit. Under this scheme, a well located on an irregularly
shaped tract containing 40 acres but drilled only 330 feet measured
perpendicularly from the boundary line would be allowed to produce
only one-half of its maximum daily potential. Periodic tests of
maximum daily potential are prescribed by the statute to keep the
proration formula current.
Apart from promoting production from exception tracts to pro-
tect correlative rights, the statute forbids prorationing. The legis-
lative purpose seems clear: demand for Ohio oil exceeds supply and
the legislature wanted to capture as much of this market as possible.
While national supply exceeds national demand, Ohio can capture
the local market (or as much of it as Ohio production can supply)
and thus reduce imports from other states. Any threat of price-
cutting competition from other states is unrealistic, so the Ohio
legislature might well have thought, since big producing states like
Louisiana, Oklahoma and especially Texas cannot afford overpro-
duction and falling prices. That this line of thinking was at least
made known to the Ohio Legislature is demonstrated by the follow-
ing excerpt from the Staff Research Report:
There are three sets of circumstances for which a state should
establish proration based on economic considerations: either the
transportation facilities are inadequate to move all of the produced
oil, with the result that there is evaporation or other waste of
stored oil; the market demand in the producing area of a state is
such that prices for that state's oil will drop; or the state produces
so much oil that the national price of oil will decline, thus affecting
the state. The first two alternatives do not seem likely for Ohio as
it presently produces only about 10 per cent of its domestic con-
sumption, it is next door to sizable Eastern markets and steps are
being taken to increase the transportation and refining outlets for
Ohio oil. A comparable case is the neighboring state of Michigan
which produced over three times the oil Ohio produced in 1961.
It has a provision which allows a limitation of production to
market demand, but it is never used because "demand exceeds pro-
duction three to one."
It is also unlikely that Ohio will cause the national price of oil
to decline. Ohio currently contributes less than two per cent of the
national production, and any significant increase will be compen-
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sated for on the national level by Texas acting in its role as the
"'national balance wheel" in oil economics. Texas can, and will,
increase or curtail production in order to keep the price of oil at a
reasonable level. Texas does not do this for any charitable
purpose, but simply because it produces about 40 per cent of the
national total and any change in price will affect Texas to a
greater extent. Furthermore, Texas is farther away from markets
than most other oil producing states, and when demand decreases,
the other states' oil will displace Texas oil because of cheaper
transportation costs. Texas can quickly increase production to
meet a sudden demand for oil because it has the largest reserves in
the country, and if it cuts back production during a market reces-
sion, the oil is still available for tomorrow.3 2
Whatever views one may hold on market-demand limitations
on production, one should recognize that the zeal of the legislature
in banning such limitation in Ohio has led it to use language much
broader than necessary-so broad in fact that effective conservation
may be difficult to achieve for some reservoirs. One vitally important
conservation tool is the establishment of gas-oil and water-oil ratios,
whereby production in excess of the ratio is prohibited. By such
regulations, primary reservoir energy is conserved and initial re-
covery greatly increased. Both the Armstrong Committee Report3
and the Staff Research Report 4 recognized the desirability of grant-
ing authority to establish gas-oil ratios, and the draft bill contained
a provision to this effect.3 5 Recall, however, that section 1509.40,
quoted above, forbids "limitation of production of oil or gas for any
-reason whatsoever."3 6 Does this mean to deny the chief authority
to limit production by regulating gas-oil and water-oil ratios? It
will be remembered that the act nowhere expressly grants the chief
rule-making power to prevent waste. True, waste is defined in the
first section of the act3 7 so as to include injury to the reservoir
through dissipation of reservoir energy. The term "waste," however,
makes but one other appearance in the act, i.e., section 1509.20, in
which operators are directed to "use every reasonable precaution in
accordance with the most approved methods of operation to stop
and prevent waste of oil or gas, or both." To find power in the chief
32 Staff Research Report 35-36.
s3 Supra note 29, at 5.
34 Supra note 1, at 37.
35 Section 1509.18 (last paragraph) of the draft version of the bill provided:
"Upon his own motion or upon the application of any interested person, the chief of
the division of oil and gas, after holding a hearing on the matter, may issue an order
limiting gas-oil ratios for those wells that are determined to be producing at a wasteful
gas-oil ratio."
36 Section 1509.40. (Emphasis added.)
37 Section 1509.01.
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to set gas-oil and water-oil ratios to prevent waste of reservoir
energy, one must determine that section 1509.20 imposes on oper-
ators the general duty to conserve reservoir energy, and that the
chief can make particular rules and regulations under the power
given him in section 1509.03. Obviously, it could be argued that the
specific provision of section 1509.40 disallowing production limita-
tions "for any reason whatsoever" overrides the general language
of section 1509.20, so that production limitations based on gas-oil
and water-oil ratios are forbidden by the act. Lack of general
authority in the chief to issue rules to prevent waste lends strength
to the argument as does deletion from the bill of express authority
to regulate gas-oil ratios.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that a new conservation
statute establishing drilling controls, authorizing forced pooling
and unitization, and reflecting a concern for maximizing ultimate
recovery (through provisions for secondary recovery operations and
in defining waste) would bar the conservation commission from
instituting a fundamental production control designed to maintain
reservoir pressure in the primary production stage. While the statute
badly needs clarification, section 1509.40 can fairly be construed
to prohibit production limitations based on market demand but not
to prohibit limitations to prevent waste.
The argument to support this position would run along the
following line: It is true that the legislature contemplated that
regularly spaced wells would produce their maximum daily potential.
This intention is reflected in section 1509.29, which limits irregularly
spaced wells to a proportion of maximum daily potential, thus
indicating the rate of production to be allowed regularly spaced
wells. Notwithstanding this general declaration of policy regarding
allowable production, the legislature made specific, contrary pro-
visions with respect to production that entails waste. All operators
are expressly enjoined to "use every reasonable precaution in ac-
cordance with the most approved methods of operation to stop and
prevent waste of oil or gas, or both."38s Waste is defined to include
dissipation of reservoir energy as well as "producing . . . in a
manner that reduces or tends to reduce the quantity of oil or gas
ultimately recoverable under prudent and proper operations... ." -39
Since excessive gas-oil and water-oil ratios destroy primary reservoir
energy thereby reducing ultimate recovery, their regulation is within
the scope of the two sections. Viewing section 1509.40 in the context
of the full act and seeking to reconcile all parts of the statute, section
1509.40 is intended only to forbid a state-wide proration scheme
38 Section 1509.20 (Emphasis added.)
39 Section 1509.01.
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whereby total state production is curtailed below capacity and
allowable production is allocated on a proportional basis to reser-
voirs and individual wells. It is not intended to prohibit customary
measures to conserve reservoir energy, such as restrictions on gas-
oil and water-oil ratios.
E. Pooling
(1) "Voluntary" pooling.
Section 1509.26 authorizes voluntary pooling by operators.
Read literally, it may authorize pooling by lessees without the
consent of their lessors. The statute provides: "The owners of
adjoining tracts may agree to pool such tracts to form a drilling
unit which conforms to the minimum acreage and distance require-
ments of the division . . . ." Section 1509.01(K) defines owner
as "the person who has the right to drill on a tract or drilling unit
and [the right] to drill into and produce from a pool and [the
right] to appropriate the oil or gas that he produces therefrom
either for himself or for others.' 'For land under oil and gas lease,
the owner is the lessee according to this definition. Thus it could
be argued that the statute gives lessees the power to pool without
the consent of their lessors (and other royalty owners) where the
tracts to be pooled are (1) adjoining and (2) form a drilling unit
in conformity to a state-wide or special field spacing order. Even
if the statute is interpreted to force the pooling of royalty interests
under these circumstances, lessees who wish to pool land to form
units bigger than those established by agency order would have to
obtain the consent of their lessors and, if Ohio follows the Texas
rule,40 of royalty and other owners of non-operating interests in
the land.
It is quite possible, of course, that the statute will not be
construed as we have suggested. An Ohio court might say that the
section presupposes prior consent from the landowner. So construed,
the section is wholly unnecessary, for it merely states a truism-that
parties can make voluntary agreements. But such superfluity does
not keep similar provisions out of the conservation statutes of other
states.41
Construed to force pooling without lessor's consent, the statute
presents no constitutional questions if applied prospectively, since
40 Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943). Louisiana follows the
contrary rule. LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377, 6
0. & G.R. 443 (1956). The subject is discussed and the Louisiana rule advocated in 6
Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 925.1 (1964). See also 2 Williams & Meyers,
Oil and Gas Law § 339.3, at 219-21 (1964).
41 E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (1953); Okla. Sta. tit. 52, § 87.1(d)
(1950) ; Pa. Stat. App. tit. 50, § 408(a) (1964).
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it merely writes into leasing contracts, a clause deemed by the legis-
lature, in the exercise of the police power to be for the general
welfare. Applied retroactively, the statute presents more serious
but not insuperable constitutional obstacles. As a matter of sub-
stantive law, the state can clearly prohibit drilling on tracts smaller
than a prescribed size if the state allows the landowner to obtain his
fair share of the petroleum recovered from a unit in which his land
is placed.42 Moreover, a state can, and section 1509.27 of the Ohio
statute does, provide for compulsory pooling of separately owned
lands to form a single drilling unit. Section 1509.26 does no more
than this, for it merely combines royalty interests when operators
agree to pool their leases. Upon this reading of section 1509.26,
section 1509.27 becomes a coordinate provision empowering the
chief to pool both royalty and operating interests when the opera-
tors cannot agree on pooling. We see no difference in substance
between mandatory pooling of royalty in the one case and in
the other.
The remaining constitutional question is procedural. Must
notice and a hearing be afforded the royalty owner? It should be
noted that neither section 1509.26 nor section 1509.27 expressly
provides for hearings for lessors. However, the only question in
which the lessor has a legal interest in being heard after leasing is
that of the formula for allocating production to the several tracts
making up the drilling unit. Any requirement of a hearing on this
issue is foreclosed under section 1509.27 by the statutory require-
ment that production be allocated on a surface acreage basis. No
such provision appears in section 1509.26 and hence one could argue
that, the allocation formula being variable, the statute must give
the lessor an opportunity to be heard on the matter before his
rights can be affected by government order. Thus the statute might
be struck down or it might be construed (perhaps with some other
provision of the Ohio statutes) to require a hearing. All of this is
unnecessarily complex, we think, because production allocation *in
the case of both voluntary and compulsory pooling is almost in-
variably based on surface acreage. So long as this is the basis of
allocation, we see no need for a hearing. Indeed, one might argue
that, in the light of section 1509.27, section 1509.26 requires pro rata
allocation according to surface acreage. If this view were adopted,
the hearing problem is eliminated.
42 Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal. 2d 315, 223 P.2d 465 (1950) ; Hunter Co. v,
McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942), appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 222 (1943) ;
Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So. 2d 85, 59 So. 2d 844, 10. & G.R. 735,
1 0. & G.R, 1239 (1952); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co, 126 Tex. 296, 316,.83
S.W.2d 935, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935). See Champlin Refinery Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
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(2) Compulsory pooling.
Under the construction advanced above, section 1509.26 pools
royalty interests when operators agree to pool working interests
and section 1509.27 pools both royalty and workings interests when
the operators cannot agree and one operator seeks and obtains a
mandatory pooling order. If section 1509.26 does not pool royalty
interests, then a recalcitrant royalty owner can be brought into
the unit under the provisions of section 1509.27.
Prerequisite for making application for a mandatory order
under section 1509.27 are two conditions, the existence of which,
presumably, must be asserted in the application:
(1) The applicant has the operating rights on a tract that
does not qualify for a well under the governing spacing order,
whether it be the state-wide order or a special field order.
(2) The applicant has sought and failed to obtain voluntary
pooling under the provisions of section 1509.26 "on a just and
equitable basis." In practice this requirement probably means no
more than that the applicant has made unsuccessful efforts to pool.
In addition, the application for a pooling order must be ac-
companied by an application for a drilling permit. Standing alone,
this would seem to mean that in Ohio, unlike other states,43 com-
pulsory pooling must be sought before a well is drilled, not after-
ward. However, later provisions of the statute contradict this posi-
tion. The next-to-last paragraph of section 1509.27 unambiguously
contemplates pooling after completion of a well. Other provisions
of the statute have a similar import.44 In resolving the conflict, we
suppose that the more explicit provisions control and that pooling
after drilling is permitted.
The chief is required to notify "all owners of land within
the area proposed to be included within the order" of filing of the
application "and of their right to a hearing if requested."' 4
As previously indicated, we construe this provision to extend only
to those having operating rights on the land. Three reasons support
this construction: (1) Owner is defined in section 1509.01(K) to
include only those with operating rights and we believe the word
"owners" in the phrase "all owners of land" is the same word
43 E.g., Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. See 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and
Gas Law § 945 (1964).
44 Another paragraph in section 150927 distinguishes between "cost of the drilling
and operation, or operation, of a well... [and grants an election to become a non-
participating owner in the] drilling and operation, or operation, of the well ......
(Emphasis added.) Distinguisfiing between "drilling and operation" and mere "oper-
atione' indicates that pooling may occur after a well is drilled, and at a time when
the only costs to be accounted for -are operation expenses.
45 Section 1509.27 (second paragraph).
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defined in section 1509.01(K). (2) Throughout the balance of the
statute the word "owner" means operator; when the legislature
meant to refer to others having interests in the land (as in the com-
pulsory unitization section46) it used the words "royalty owners."
(3) The substantive provisions of the order on which the hearing is
held concern operators only. Those provisions cover the boundaries
of the drilling unit, the drill site, the basis for sharing drilling and
production costs, and the person to be designated operator of the
unit. The only provision of legal concern to lessors is the one allo-
cating production from the unit well. Since the statute fixes a
invariable rule on allocation-pro rata sharing on the basis of surface
acreage-participation in the hearing by royalty owners is pointless.
While we believe this interpretation is the preferable reading
of the statute, we recognize that a court might read the word
"owner" distributively, holding that "all owners of land" in section
1509.27 included lessors and royalty owners. In such a case, the
same court is very likely to say that section 1509.26, which provides
no notice to royalty owners, merely states the truism that if al
parties agree there may be voluntary pooling. The reasoning would
be that if the legislature provided for notice and hearing to royalty
owners in compulsory pooling proceedings under section 1509.27,
it surely would have done so in section 1509.26 if pooling of royalty
interests thereunder had been intended to be compulsory. Since no
hearing was provided for, no compulsory pooling was intended. And
if the court should extend the right of notice and hearing to royalty
owners in section 1509.27 as a matter of constitutional necessity,
it seems most probable that section 1509.26, lacking provisions for
notice and hearing, will be construed as merely declaratory of the
existing law that lessees can pool if their lessors consent.
The two principal problems of compulsory pooling orders are
dealt with expressly, though not clearly, in the act. The first
problem is how costs are to be shared by operators owning leases
in the drilling unit. An issue arises when an operator objects to
putting up his share of drilling expenses for a well he expects to
be noncommercial. At least four separate solutions to this problem
are analytically possible: (1) The non-consenting operator could
be required, despite his objection, to put up his share of the costs in
cash in advance.4 7 (2) The non-consenting operator could be given
46 Section 1509.28(B).
47 In Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 165 So. 2d 905, 21 0. & G.R.
58 (La. App. 1964), writ refused, 246 La. 842, 167 So. 2d 668, 21 0. & G.R. 66 (1964),
it was held that a non-drilling lessee who had sought unitization could be compelled to
reimburse the drilling lessee for a proportionate share of the drilling costs, rejecting the
former's contention that he was entitled to be treated as a carried party. The case was
noted in 39 Tul. L. Rev. 381 (1965).
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a free ride, in that if the well were unsuccessful he would owe noth-
ing, and if successful he would be liable for his share of costs out of
production. This is the position taken by a number of states.48 (3)
48 Ala. Code tit. 26, § 179(36) C (1958) provides:
In the event such integration or pooling is required, the operator designated
by the board to develop and operate the integrated or pooled unit shall have
the right to charge against the interest of each other owner in the production
from the wells drilled by such designated operator the actual expenditures
required for such purpose, not in excess of what are reasonable, including
a reasonable charge for supervision; and the operator shall have the right to
receive the first production from such wells drilled by him thereon which
otherwise would be delivered or paid to the other parties jointly interested
in the drilling of the well so that the amount due by each of them for his
share of the expense of drilling, equipping, and operating the well may be
paid to the operator of the well out of production ...
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 377.28 (2) (1960) contains substantially the same provisions.
It specifically states that an owner who objects to having his interests pooled shall not
be liable for drilling costs in the event of a dry hole.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-505(A) (1956) gets the same result in fewer words:
"As to owners who refuse to agree upon pooling, the order shall provide for re-
imbursement for costs chargeable to each such owner out of, and only out of, pro-
duction from the unit belonging to such owner. . . ." Alaska Stat. § 31.05. 100(c)
(1962); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100-6-4(7) (1963); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-909(2)
(1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 522.060 (1963); S.D. Code § 42.0706(3) (0) (6) (Supp.
1960) ; Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(g) (1960) contain substantially the same provision.
The statutes of Alaska, Arizona, and Nevada give the unit operator a lien on the
production allocated to the owners who object to having their interests pooled. This
provision does not alter the free-ride nature of the statutes.
The Utah statute provides:
The order shall determine the interest of each owner in the unit, and may
provide in substance that, as to each owner who agrees with the person or
persons drilling and operating the well for the payment by the owner of his
share of the cQsts, such owner, unless he has agreed otherwise, shall be entitled
to receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production
of the well applicable to the tract of the consenting owner, and, as to each
owner vho does not agree, he shall be entitled to receive from the person or
persons drilling and operating the well on the unit his share of the production
applicable to his interest, after the person or persons drilling and operating
said well have recovered the share of the cost of drilling and operating appli-
cable to such nonconsenting owner's interest plus a reasonable charge for
supervision and storage.
The statutes of Colorado, Nebraska, and South Dakota contain substantially
the same provision. The provision does not alter the free-ride nature of the statutes.
The provision of some statutes, of which Indiana's is typical, is somewhat am-
biguous. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 46-1714(c) (1952) provides:
In the event such integration is required, the operator designated by the com-
mission to develop and operate the integrated unit shall have the right to
charge to each other interested owner the actual expenditures required for
such purpose not in excess of what are reasonable, including charges for
supervision, and the operator shall have the right to receive the first produc-
tion from any well drilled by him thereon. ...
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The non-consenting owner could be relieved of any obligation to
share in the risk of drilling, but if the well were successful he would
be required to pay a sum greater than his share of costs, e.g., 200
per cent of his share of costs. This is known as a non-consent
penalty and is often used in voluntary pooling and unitization agree-
ments40 and in compulsory orders in some states.50 (4) The non-
consenting operator may be required to transfer his interest to the
operator who wishes to drill, for a consideration fixed by the regula-
tory agency and based on the market value. This solution is adopted
in a few states."1 In addition, the non-consenting operator can be
given an election between the last two alternatives. 2 The draft bill
adopted the last-named solution, 3 but somewhere along the line,
the mandatory transfer provision was deleted, so that the bill, as
enacted, provides only for a 200 per cent non-consent penalty.
For the most part, the operation of the statutory non-consent
provision is reasonably clear. An operator has a right not to par-
ticipate in the risk of drilling; that is, an operator can insist on
being a carried party,54 although some of the terms and conditions
of the carried arrangement can be determined by the chief. Such
carried parties are designated nonparticipating owners in the statute;
carrying parties are called participating owners. When an operator
elects to be a carried party, production is divided as follows: the
royalty interest of the lessor is deducted from production allocable
to the non-consenting lessee's tract and is paid to the lessor. The
Ga. Code Ann. § 43-717(c) (1957) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 104 § 83a(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1964); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-393(a) (1960) are very similar. These statutes
will probably be construed to give the non-consenting operator a free ride.
49 See 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 921.10 (1964).
0 Id. § 944. See also Note, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 381, 383 (1965).
51 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 53-115 3-1(C) (d) (Supp. 1963) ; Okla. Stat. tit. 52,
§ 87.1(d) (1961) (discussed infra, note 57).
02 Ibid.
53 Section 150924 of the draft bill provided:
If the owner does not elect to participate in the risk and cost of the drilling
and operation, or operation, of a well, the order shall further provide for
one or more just and equitable alternatives whereby such owner may either
elect to surrender his leasehold interest to the participating owners on some
reasonable basis and for a reasonable consideration which, if not agreed upon,
shall be determined by the chief; or he may elect to be a nonparticipating
owner in the drilling and operation, or operation, of the well, on a limited or
carried basis upon terms and conditions determined by the chief to be just
and reasonable.
The section went on to require a 2007 nonconsent penalty.
54 A carried party is an owner of minerals for whom costs are advanced by the
carrying party, who recovers such costs out of production attributed to the carried
party's interest. See Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 42 (1964)
(under the entry, "Carried interest").
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balance of the production allocable to the tract is paid to those who
bore the well expense until they have recouped twice the share of
costs allocated to the tract.5 As an example, suppose the following
case. A unit well produces 5000 barrels of oil a month from a unit
consisting of 50 acres. 0 is the non-consenting lessee of 10 acres.
Under the statute his tract is entitled to 1000 barrels for that month,
since his surface acreage is one-fifth of the total unit acreage. Assume
that the lease with the fee owner calls for the usual one-eighth
royalty. The fee owner would get 125 barrels of oil; the remaining
875 barrels would be credited against the obligation of the non-
consenting operator. This process would continue monthly until the
value of the oil credited to O's account equalled 200 per cent of his
share of drilling expense. Thereafter, for the first time, 0 would
receive income from the well, measured by his share of the working
interest oil (the 875 barrels mentioned above) less his share of
operating costs. The statute apparently permits the penalty to
apply to operating costs indefinitely, so that the non-consenting
operator will be paying twice his share of operating costs for as long
as production lasts, if the mandatory pooling order so provides. In
the rare case of unleased land, the fee owner of the minerals is
treated as if he had leased, receiving one-eighth of the attributed
production free of costs, with the remaining production going to
satisfy 200 per cent of the landowner's share of drilling costs.
The act does not make explicit provision for excess royalty
reserved by a lessor, but the general statutory provisions seem to
require that the royalty reserved by a lessor, whatever its size,
be deducted from the non-consenting operator's share of produc-
tion and paid to the lessor before any share of production is allocated
to satisfy the claim of the carrying party. Thus, if the lease on
Blackacre reserves a one-fourth royalty and the lessee elects to
be carried, the claim of the carrying party must be satisfied out
of three-fourths (rather than seven-eighths) of the production allo-
cated to Blackacre.
The same allocation of production would be made where land
is burdened by an outstanding nonparticipating royalty interest and
is leased by the executive for an excess royalty. Thus if X owns a
perpetual, nonparticipating Y48 royalty in Blackacre and L, the
owner of Blackacre, leases the land for 3 o royalty, %(6 being desig-
nated as X's and 2/6 as L's, the carrying party's claim must be
satisfied out of 136 of the production allocated to Blackacre.
The situation is less clear where Blackacre has not been leased
by L and is subject to an outstanding A; nonparticipating royalty
interest owned by X. The statute provides that the carrying party
55 Section 1509.27.
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shall be entitled to Blackacre's share of production "exclusive of the
royalty interest if the fee holder has leased his land, otherwise one-
eighth of his share of the production. . . ." We believe the statute
would be construed to allocate a % royalty to Blackacre and to
leave to the agreement of the parties the division of royalty. Thus
X would take one-half of the royalty and L would take the other
half.
In the unlikely event of a landowner granting a nonpartici-
pating royalty in excess of %, a flat application of the statutory
words would limit the royalty owner's share of production to the
statutory %. At first blush this result seems inconsistent with
allowing excess royalty where the land has been leased. Further
reflection convinces us that the result is sound. A legislature might
well decide not to allow a landowner to create excess royalty and
reap the economic benefit therefrom and yet decline to participate
in the costs of drilling, which might never be recovered because of
the large outstanding royalty. The legislature might well distin-
guish this situation, which is wide open to abuse, from the case of
excess royalty obtained by a landowner in arms' length bargaining
with an oil and gas lessee. The self-interest of the lessee, whose
return depends upon the lease having value in excess of the royalty,
could be thought a sufficient safeguard against the improper use of
excess royalty.
The division of costs between participating and nonparticipat-
ing operators is determined by the chief according to a standard
of "just and reasonable." "' The chief also has the power to deter-
mine the amount of the costs, in case of dispute. We would expect
the usual allocation of costs to be based on surface acreage, since
production is allocated on this basis.
Two questions are raised by the non-consent penalty provision
in the act. The first is its constitutional validity and the second,
which bears closely on the first, is the discretion the chief has in
applying it.
Several states have non-consent penalty provisions in their
compulsory pooling and unitization statutes, but these are usually
coupled with an option given the non-consenting operator either
to pay the penalty out of production or to sell his lease to the unit
operator.57 However, at least one other state (New Mexico) makes
56 Section 1509.27 (third paragraph).
57 E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 408(c) (1964). See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 353.640(3)
(Baldwin 1963).
Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 87.1(d) (1961) does not specify the modes of adjusting the
rights of consenting and non-consenting operators with regard to expenses, but the
Oklahoma commission, under the authority of this section has required the payment
in advance of a non-consenting operator's share of expenses or his sale of the lease to
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the non-consent penalty the only alternative to sharing the risk.5
The validity of orders requiring the non-consenting operator
to transfer his lease for a consideration set by the agency or to share
in the risk of drilling by putting up his part of costs (or a bond
therefor) has been established in one state court and has passed
muster in the United States Supreme Court. 9 We know of no case
sustaining a non-consent penalty either as the non-consenting
operator's sole option or as an alternative to selling his lease. 0
Can it pass the constitutional test? So far as the United States
Supreme Court is concerned, we think the practical answer is yes,
whatever constitutional objections might be thought to exist in
theory. The Court has not invalidated, on constitutional grounds,
a state oil and gas conservation statute or order since 1937,61 and
it has in full opinions 62 and by per c'riam orders 63 upheld a good
many.
The practical test on constitutionality will therefore come in
the Ohio Supreme Court. We have neither the learning nor the
desire to acquire the learning necessary to predict the Ohio court's
conclusion on the question, since its decision will presumably rest
(at least in part) on its prior substantive due process decisions.
We can, however, seek to identify the issues that will be presented
and develop some of the considerations relevant to the decision.
the unit operator. Such orders have been upheld. Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n,
327 P.2d 699, 7 0. & G.R. 72, 9 0. & G.R. 196 (Okla. 1957), appeal dimnissed for
want of a substantial federal question, 358 U.S. 642 (1959) ; Wakefield v. Oklahoma,
306 P.2d 305, 7 0. & G.R. 291 (Okla. 1957). A leading authority on the subject states
that the Oklahoma commission has also ordered the non-consenting owner to elect
between selling his lease and becoming a carried party subject to a non-consent penalty.
Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization 238 (1957) (stating that the non-consent
penalty is 150 to 200% of costs).
58 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(c) (Supp. 1965) (50% limitation on the penalty).
59 Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, supra note 57.
60 The case nearest in point is Wakefield v. Oklahoma, supra note 57, in which
the court rejected the non-consenting party's contention that in addition to the option
to pay a share of expenses or sell the lease the non-consenting owner must be afforded
the option to become a carried party with a non-consent penalty of 150% of his
proportionate share of costs. Such a decision does not come close to holding that non-
consent penalties are valid.
61 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
62 See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950)
(minimum gas price statute); Railroad Conm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co, 311
U.S. 570 (1941) (prorationing scheme in East Texas field).
63 Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 358 U.S. 642 (1959) (compulsory pooling
order requiring lessee to pay his share of costs of unit well in advance or sell his lease
to unit operator); Humbel Oil & Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 331 U.S. 791 (1947)
(proration order causing petitioner to suffer drainage of 30 million barrels of oil);
Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222 (1943) (compulsory pooling statute).
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The following underlying propositions should be beyond dis-
pute: the objectives of compulsory pooling are well within the
police powers of the state. These objectives are to prevent economic
waste resulting from the drilling of unnecessary wells and to pro-
tect correlative rights by enabling mineral owners to receive out
of production their proportionate share of the minerals in place.
If anyone doubts the social benefit of compulsory pooling, let him
examine the sorry mess existing in Texas from the 1930's until this
year, when a pooling statute was finally enacted.64 When tracts are
combined through compulsory pooling, the problem must be faced
of the operator owning a lease in the unit who objects to the finan-
cial risk of drilling. As we have seen, some states, by statute or
commission policy, place the full risk of a dry hole on the operator
who wishes to drill. "5 While this may be reasonable, it is certainly
not unreasonable to put some limits on free rides. The question is:
What sort of limits? Here the matter of discretionary application
of the penalty becomes important. As we read the statute, the
sole alternative to participation in costs is the imposition of the
penalty, always in the amount of 200 per cent-no more, no less.
It is true that section 1509.27 permits a nonparticipating owner to
elect to become a carried party "upon terms and conditions deter-
mined by the chief to be just and reasonable." But the following
sentence takes away the discretion conferred by this provision, for
it provides that the participating owners "shall be entitled" to the
200 per cent non-consent penalty.
We confess to a lack of enthusiasm for a rule that says, in
every case, without regard to the degree of risk, the price of
refusal to share in drilling costs at the outset is 200 per cent of those
costs if the well comes in. The statutes of other states are not so
rigid; even New Mexico limits the penalty to a maximum of 150
per cent of costs and allows the commission to vary the figure down-
ward depending on the risk involved.66 In fact, a penalty of an addi-
tional 25 per cent of costs is the common New Mexico practice. 67
Since the aim of the non-consent penalty is to compensate the
participating lessees for the risk they have taken, an inflexible
penalty of 200 per cent of costs begins to look somewhat arbitrary.
One test of its constitutional validity might be the following:
Is there another practicable means of obtaining the same result
64 See Hardwicke, "Oil Well Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property
Rights in Texas," 31 Texas L. Rev. 99 (1952) ; Hardwicke & Woodward, "Fair Share
and the Small Tract in Texas," 41 Texas L. Rev. 75 (1962).
65 See note 48 supra.
66 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14 (Supp. 1965).
67 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 905.2 (1964).
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but better calculated to protect the interests of the parties? The
answer to this question depends on the ability to make a nice
determination of the risk of drilling. We believe that in many in-
stances, a closer calculation may be made. The probabilities of
commercial production are a great deal higher with development
wells than with outpost wells drilled in hopes of making a long
extension of a partly developed pool. On the other hand, in any
particular case, there could be violent disagreement between two
equally positive experts over the classification of the well as a
development well or an outpost well. It would have been better,
in our view, to give the chief discretion to make the penalty less
than 200 per cent, as it would have been better to afford the non-
participating owner a three-way option: (1) to pay, (2) to assign
the lease for a consideration, or (3) to suffer a non-consent penalty.
Nevertheless, we would not conclude that the statute is uncon-
stitutional for failure to do so. A legislature could rationally reach
the conclusion that requiring the regulatory commission to deter-
mine the risk of drilling in every case of dispute was unduly burden-
some, since the accuracy of the determination would always be
doubtful and the expense of administration much greater. While
the judges-and we-might disagree with this conclusion, a rea-
sonable man could adopt it, and hence the provision should be
upheld.
A final question, one of interpretation, should be raised about
the statutory sharing arrangements between consenting and non-
consenting operators. The next-to-last paragraph of section 1509.27
provides:
In instances where a well is completed prior to the pooling
of interests in a drilling unit under this section, the sharing of
production and adjustment of the original costs of drilling, equip-
ping, and completing the well shall be from the effective date of
the mandatory pooling order.68
This section is designed, of course, to deal with the sharing
of income and expense of a well drilled before the unit is formed.
There is no occasion for the imposition of a non-consent penalty,
because the operator who drilled, willingly took the risk before he
or anyone else proposed the formation of a unit. The two questions
under the section are: (1) How are pre-pooling capital and oper-
ating expenses to be accounted for, and (2) how is pre-pooling
production income to be divided? While the language of the para-
graph is somewhat uncertain in meaning, particularly the reference
68 Section 1509.27. (Emphasis added.)
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to "adjustment of the original costs," we believe that the intent was
to divide unrecovered drilling expense and production income there-
after accruing, as of the effective date of the pooling order. To
illustrate the operation of the paragraph as thus construed, suppose
operator 0 drilled a well on a twenty-acre leasehold. Thereafter
forty-acre spacing is ordered for the field, and O's lease is pooled
with operator P's adjoining, undrilled, twenty-acre leasehold. At
the time this mandatory pooling order took effect, 0 had produced
100,000 dollars of working interest oil, thereby recovering one-half
of his original drilling and equipment costs of 200,000 dollars.
(Operating expenses will be ignored for simplicity.) On our pro-
posed reading of the statute, P would be entitled to one-half of the
oil thereafter produced by the well (less the royalty he owes his
lessor) and would be liable to pay out of such production 50,000
dollars in capital costs.
Adjusting the benefits and burdens as of the date of pooling
awards an appropriate benefit to the drilling operator where he
has fully recovered his costs and is making a profit when pooling is
ordered. Thus, using the parties above, if 0 has recovered the full
200,000 dollars in capital costs and has a profit of 100,000 dollars
from production when the pooling order takes effect, P gets no share
of the past profit. His participation in production income begins on
the effective date of pooling. Since 0 alone has taken the risk of
drilling, he is entitled to receive the profit made before pooling.
The statute may be read, less plausibly we think, to direct the
reconstruction of the income and expense accounts retroactively to
the commencement of drilling. P would share in half the income
and pay half the expenses from such time. In the second example
given above, he would thus obtain one-half of the 100,000 dollars
profit that accrued before pooling. Despite the reference to an
adjustment of the original costs of drilling, equipping and com-
pleting the well, we doubt that the legislature intended to adopt
this procedure. It is clear that the income account is not recon-
structed for the benefit of royalty owners, for the statute explicitly
states that "the sharing of production ... shall be from the effec-
tive date of the mandatory pooling order." This is a practical
provision to avoid the need and difficulty of recovering one-half of
the royalty payments made to O's lessor and handing them over
to P's lessor. If we are to handle production income the same for
both lessor and lessee (and we should because the statute makes
no distinction between them for this purpose), we cannot reconstruct
the income account for the purpose of allowing the late-joining
operator to share in previous profits.
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A third constructional possibility is to charge the late-joining
operator's share of original costs to production obtained after
entry of the pooling order. We can see no reason, however, why the
legislature would wish to charge a share of original costs without
crediting initial production. Moreover the statute directs that the
adjustment of original costs be made as of the effective date of the
pooling order, which seems to require that credit be given for costs
recouped before pooling.
In sum, it is our view that the present statutory language was
intended to have the same effect as the language in the proposed
bill,69 which was probably taken from the Pennsylvania act:
In instances where a well is completed prior to the integration
of interests in a drilling unit, the sharing of production shall be
from the effective date of the integration, except that, in calculating
costs, credit shall be given for the value of the owner's share of
any prior production from the well.7 0
The other principal problem that must be solved in any com-
pulsory pooling statute is the effect of the mandatory order on lease
terms. Because the same problem is also presented by compulsory
unitization orders, we shall postpone discussion of it until we have
considered the unitization section of the act.
F. Compulsory unitization
In addition to compulsory pooling, the act provides for com-
pulsory unitization. The differences between the two go both to
size and purpose: compulsory pooling is designed to save drilling
costs and to protect correlative rights by putting together enough
land to form a drilling unit, which might be 40 to 80 acres for
oil wells and as much as 640 acres for gas wells. Each field is
divided up into uniform drilling units, with one well on each unit
in the pool. Compulsory unitization is designed to place all or a
substantial part of a reservoir under the management of one oper-
ator, with wells quite irregularly spaced if reservoir mechanics
make this desirable. Other purposes of unitization generally (though
not necessarily in Ohio) are to reduce (even more than the spacing
order does) the number of wells drilled into the pool, to permit
pressure maintenance and cycling operations, and to carry on
secondary recovery operations.71
(1) Requisites for obtaining an order.
Under section 1509.28, compulsory unitization may be initiated
by either the chief or by operators owning leases on 65 per cent of
69 Section 1509.24 of the draft bill (next-to-last paragraph).
70 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 408(c) (1964) (last sentence).
71 See 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §§ 901, 913.1 (1964).
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the land overlying the pool. For an order compelling unitization to
take effect the following conditions must be met:
(1) The chief must find that unitization is "reasonably
necessary to increase substantially the ultimate recovery of oil and
gas" from the pool. (Although the statutory use of the words "oil
and gas" is in the conjunctive, the legislative intent was undoubt-
edly to speak in the disjunctive, for it makes no sense to limit
unitization to pools producing both kinds of hydrocarbons. More-
over, elsewhere in the statute, provisions relating to compulsory
unitization speak of oil and gas in the disjunctive. It would seem,
however, that the requirement that the chief find that ultimate
recovery will be increased limits the purposes for which unitization
may be ordered. For example, if the sole purpose and effect of
the order is to save drilling expense, the order is probably not
authorized.)
(2) The chief must find that the value of the estimated
additional recovery will exceed the cost of conducting the unit
operation.
(3) The unit operation plan, prescribed in the order, must
be approved in writing by operators who will be required under the
plan to pay 65 per cent of the costs of the operation. Quite con-
ceivably, this could be a single operator.72
(4) The unit operation plan must be approved in writing
by owners of 65 per cent of the royalty in the unit.
The exact language of this last condition requires approval
"by the royalty owners of sixty-five per cent of the normal one-
eighth royalty in the unit." "Royalty interest" is defined in section
1509.01(L) to mean "the fee holder's interest in the production
from a well, usually one-eighth of the gross production." The
statute apparently intends, therefore, not to extend the vote to
owners of overriding royalty, oil payments, or other nonoperating
interests carved out of the working interest. Other statutes provide
for a broader franchise,73 but such extension of the right to vote is
apparently unnecessary under the federal constitution. As first
enacted the Oklahoma unitization statute allowed the vote to
operators but not to lessor-royalty owners and was upheld in these
words by the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
The question is not the wisdom of granting the right of protest
to the lessees while withholding it from the royalty owners but
whether it was within the power of the Legislature so to do. It was
72 Some statutes require the consent of at least two operators. See 6 Williams &
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 913.5 (1964).
73 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13.139 (107) (Supp. 1963) (vote on plan given to
"those persons who are owners of record of at least 75 per cent of the production or
proceeds thereof that will be credited to interests which are free of cost such as but
not limited to royalties, overriding royalties and production payments .. . ).
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within the power of the Legislature to do so because being within
its police power to enact the law without the consent of either
lessees or royalty owners it was optional with it to require the
consent of either. Where privilege is granted to some in such
situation the Constitution is satisfied if all similarly situated are
treated alike.74
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 5
It might be argued that granting the right to vote to some
royalty owners but not to others is an unreasonable classification and
hence a violation of the equal protection clause, but a convincing
answer seems to be that adequate protection is otherwise given to
overriding royalty owners. The interest of the lessee and of the
overriding royalty owner will often be identical, for the production
allocated to the tract will be shared by both. The vote given to the
operator is sufficient protection of the overriding royalty owner's
interest in such a case. Moreover the plan is subject to attack by
the overriding royalty owner where he believes he has suffered from
unfair dealing by the operator. 0 Such a case might arise where an
operator owned adjoining leases within the unit area and contrived
to have more unit production allocated to the lease not burdened
by overriding royalty than to the lease subject to complainant's
interest. Protection against unfair dealing of this kind will be
afforded the overriding royalty owner whether or not he was
entitled to vote, or did vote, on the plan.77 We believe, therefore,
that the lack of voting rights in overriding royalty owners does not
invalidate the statutory scheme for imposing unitization on a pool.
A second question raised by the voting provisions is how the
tally is made of royalty owner's votes. The statute requires written
approval "by royalty owners of sixty-five per cent of the normal
one-eighth royalty in the unit." Two uncertainties inhere in this
language: (1) What are the voting rights of owners of royalty
larger or smaller than "the normal one-eighth"? (2) What weight,
if any, is to be given to acreage?
Regarding the first question, several constructional possibilities
exist. Read literally, the statute could mean that owners of abnormal
(or subnormal) royalty cannot vote at all. The only voters are
74 Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 549, 231 P.2d 997,
1004 (1951).
75 Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952).
76 Section 1509.36 permits "any person claiming to be aggrieved or adversely
affected by an order of the chief" to appeal to the Oil and Gas Board of Review,
whence a further appeal can be taken to the courts. Section 1509.37. Moreover, review
of the unitization order may be sought in the first instance in the courts. Section
1509.36.
17 See 4 Williams, Oil and Gas Law § 6702 (1962).
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"royalty owners.., of the normal one-eighth .... " Since no reason
whatever can be discovered for taking the vote away from owners
of excess or undersized royalty, and since to do so might raise very
serious questions of equal protection, we reject such a construction.
Another possibility is to construe the statute as providing a
one-man-one-vote rule, whereby owners of more or less than one-
eighth royalty are given the same voting power as owners of the
usual royalty. Literal application of such an interpretation would
be absurd, however, because the owner of a standard one-eighth
could subdivide his royalty into as many parts as would be neces-
sary to defeat the plan. We doubt that even extreme advocates of
the one-man-one-vote principle would go so far.78
A third constructional possibility is to read the statute as
treating all royalty as being, for voting purposes, one-eighth of
production per tract of land. Owners of excess royalty would be
treated as owning only one-eighth; owners of subdivided royalty
(whether created before or after lease) would be given partial votes
in the proportion that their fractional interest bears to the standard
one-eighth. Under this interpretation, a landowner who leased for
one-sixteenth instead of the usual one-eighth might or might not
get a whole vote. We doubt that the legislature gave any thought at
all to this problem; while royalty in excess of one-eighth is common
enough to command attention, lease royalty of less than one-eighth
is exceedingly rare if, in fact, it ever occurs. The operation of the
statute, upon this construction, can be illustrated by an assumed
and highly simplified set of facts: A, B, and C each own 1000 acres
of land in fee, the total of which makes up the entire unit area. A
leased for a Y royalty; B for the standard %; and C for the stand-
ard %, but C conveyed one-half of his royalty to D. A has one vote;
B has one vote; and C and D each have one-half of a vote. Any com-
bination of three affirmative votes out of this group will satisfy
the statute since A owns only / royalty for voting purposes.
Moreover, affirmative votes by A and B will be sufficient approval
of the plan although C and D dissent, since A and B together have,
for voting purposes, two-thirds of the total fee owner's royalty in
the unit area.
A fourth constructional possibility views the statute as reflect-
ing only one legislative concern; that of subdivided landowner
royalty. The legislature could very properly be concerned that
owners of less than one-eighth be limited in their voting power.
As we have pointed out, one royalty owner opposed to the unit
78 But cf. Warren, C. J.: "Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964). We continue to believe that royalty,
while classified as land for most purposes, is not land for this purpose.
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operations plan could defeat the plan by royalty conveyances if
every owner of royalty of whatever size has one vote. And while
a legislature might consider this possibility too unlikely an event to
provide for, the division of land-owner royalty both before and
after lease is an exceedingly common occurrence. A legislature
could thus be concerned with providing a system whereby voting
weight was in accordance with economic interest. This is precisely
the standard used with respect to operators, who vote in accord-
ance with their share of unit operation expense. Thus, the legislature
took the normal one-eighth royalty as the voting standard, intend-
ing to decrease voting strength for owners of less and to increase
it for owners of more, with the weight of the vote depending on the
ratio between the owners' royalty and the normal one-eighth roy-
alty. In the example given, A would have two votes, B one vote,
and C and D one-half vote each. A alone could block the unit plan.
A and B, having together 75 per cent of the votes, could put the
plan into effect, as could A, C, and D. For reasons that will be
given in the following discussion of the weight to be given to
acreage we believe the legislature intended the result last suggested,
which we also believe to be the preferable voting scheme.
The statute fails to indicate clearly the weight that acreage
is to have in the royalty owners' vote. Disregarding language relat-
ing to the problem discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
statute requires written approval "by the royalty owners of sixty-
five per cent of the .. .royalty in the unit." We believe the intent
here was to put voting on a royalty-acre basis.79 It seems unlikely
that the cumbersome phrase quoted above was intended to adopt
the one-man (i.e., one royalty owner)-one-vote principle, for the
natural phrase to accomplish this purpose is to require approval
by "sixty-five percent of the royalty owners in the unit." The
phrase actually used parallels the provision on operator voting,
where there must be an affirmative vote "by those owners who...
will be required to pay at least sixty-five percent of the costs of the
unit operation ... ." If expenses are allocated on the basis of sur-
face acreage, value of leaseholds, acre-feet of recoverable oil or gas
in place, or on any other basis reflecting the economic interest of
the operator, as we think the federal and state constitutions are
likely to require, then the argument is persuasive that royalty
79 Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 344 (1964), defines
"royalty acre" as follows: "A full one-eighth royalty on one acre of land; e.g., in a
one-hundred acre tract, ownership of one-half of the royalty interest (where a mini-
mum one-eighth is required in leases) or of a IA6 royalty is the equivalent of owning
50 royalty acres. See Dickens v. Tisdale, 204 Ark. 838, 164 S.W.2d 990 (1942);
Inslee v. Palmer, 153 Kan. 147, 109 P.2d 208 (1941)."
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voting rights were intended to be established on the same basis-
economic interest of the royalty owner. We therefore believe that
the phrase "royalty in the unit" means the number of royalty acres
in the unit and that the statute requires an affirmative vote of
owners of sixty-five per cent of the total number of royalty acres,
one royalty acre being "the normal one-eighth royalty" on one acre.
The operation of the voting section upon this construction of
the statute is demonstrated in the following illustration. Suppose
in a 640-acre section the division of ownership and the lease royalty
are as follows:
Land- Premises
owner owned ro
A N.W. %
B N.E. %
C Undivided % of south %
D Undivided % of S.W. Y4
E %2 nonparticipating
royalty in S.E. %
F Undivided % of S.E. %,
subject to E's %2
royalty interest
In this situation the royalty acres
are as follows:
Land-
owner
A
B
C
D
E
F
Total
Royalty
acres
320
160
160
80
40
40
800
tAmse
yalty
'A
'A
% (of which C gets %
or a 1,46 royalty)
% (of which D gets %
or a 31( royalty)% (of which E gets %)
% (of which F gets %)
owned and the voting rights
Votes
320
160
160
80
40
40
800
Ordinarily, if the lease royalty is uniformly % on all portions
of the section of land proposed to be unitized, there would be 640
royalty acres, and 640 votes. The required 65 per cent vote would
mean that there must be 416 affirmative votes. In this hypothetical,
by reason of the abnormal royalty in A's lease, there will be 800
royalty acres in the section and 800 votes; A's %A royalty has added
160 votes to the rolls. The required 65 per cent means there must
be 520 affirmative votes.
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This last suggested voting scheme is the one we think the legis-
lature most likely intended: It parallels the voting system estab-
lished for operators, it gives rational effect to the phrase "normal
one-eighth" and it explains the use of the cumbersome phrase
"owners of sixty-five per cent of . . . royalty in the unit" when
"sixty-five per cent of royalty owners" would have been the natural
phrase if acreage were intended not to be a factor in the voting
process. Moreover, we believe that since the legislature gave royalty
owners a vote, when it did not have to,80 it is more likely than not
that the vote was intended to be weighted in accordance with the
economic interest of the voter. There is little point in giving royalty
owners a vote at all if all votes count equally, regardless of finan-
cial interest. Indeed, large landowners with the biggest financial
interest might prefer no vote for royalty owners at all over a
voting system that disregards acreage, for they might be better off
if the operators (with whom the large landowners have a commu-
nity of interest) and the chief alone determined the contents of the
plan. To the extent, then, that the voting provisions reflect legis-
lative concern over royalty owners' economic interests, the statute
should be construed to fix voting on a royalty acre basis.
(2) Contents of the order.
Having concluded our consideration of the conditions pre-
requisite to the effective promulgation of a unitization order, we
turn now to the contents of the order. The standard governing the
chief in fixing the terms and conditions of the order is that of "just
and reasonable," which is vague, but perhaps necessarily so. At
any rate, it is commonplace in unitization statutes." The order is
to prescribe a plan for unit operations which shall specify the
boundaries of the unit area, the nature of the operations contem-
plated, the formula for allocating production to the tracts in the
unit, the credits and charges to be made for equipment contributed
to the unit operation, the formula for sharing expenses, the mode
of supervising the operation, and the time the unit operation shall
begin and end. Provision is made for additional terms in the order
as may be appropriate for conducting the operation and protecting
correlative rights. Most of these provisions are routine; only a few
need to be noticed specially.
80 Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997
(1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 390 (1952), discussed at text accompanying notes
74 & 75 supra.
81 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 26, § 179(72) (1958) ("order shall be fair and
reasonable and equitable"); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13.139 (106) (Supp. 1963) ("fair,
reasonable and equitable"); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.4 (Supp. 1964) ("fair,
reasonable and equitable").
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The formulation and promulgation of a unitization order must
be preceded by a hearing in which the parties will present evidence
on the need for unitization and the essential terms of the order. The
two provisions of primary importance in any order are the produc-
tion allocation formula and the expense-bearing formula. The
statute specifies the basis for sharing production in the absence of
agreement by the interested parties, which we take to include roy-
alty owners. The statutory standard is "value... for development
of oil and gas by unit operations," with each tract sharing produc-
tion in the ratio that its value (so defined) bears to the total value
of the tracts in the unit. The determination is made by the chief
on the evidence adduced at the hearing.
No standard for sharing expenses is specified in the act. We
should think, however, that the expense-bearing formula would
usually conform to the production participation formula, for an
operator's return should ordinarily be commensurate with his
investment.
Unlike the pooling section, the unitization section grants no
election to an operator to participate in expenses or to become a
carried party subject to a non-consent penalty. The statute pro-
vides that an order should include:
(6) A provision, if necessary, for carrying or otherwise
financing any person who is unable to meet his financial obliga-
tions in connection with the unit, allowing a reasonable interest
charge for such service ;82
The intent here seems to be to require all operators owning
leases in the unit to bear their share of expenses if financially able
to do so. An operator (or the owner of unleased lands) who lacks
the financial ability to participate is to be carried or otherwise
financed and charged a fee for this service. The statute does not
contemplate orders requiring a non-consenting operator to pay or
to sell his interest, nor does it adopt the flat 200 per cent non-con-
sent penalty of the pooling statute. Why does the unitization section
differ in this way from the pooling section and can such difference
be justified? We believe the difference exists because of and is
justified by the difference in theory between the two sections. The
pooling section anticipates that risks will be taken in the boring of
wells on the pooled drilling unit. It permits an operator to opt out
of the risk by paying out of production, if any, twice his share
of costs.
82 Section 150928(A) (6).
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The unitization section contemplates a low-risk operation. This
is not to say that all wells will be successful or that the operation
will be profitable from the beginning. But the statute does assume
a producing reservoir that can be made more profitable-in the
long run-by unit operations engaged in pressure maintenance or
secondary recovery. Before unitization can be ordered, the chief
must find that unit operation will substantially increase the ulti-
mate recovery of petroleum and that the estimated value of the
increased recovery will exceed the estimated costs of the operation.
Of course the chief may be wrong, but on such findings, it is none-
theless reasonable to make operators who can pay their share of
costs without a right of refusal, and to allow operators who cannot
pay to remain in the operation subject to a financing charge.
Apart from the effect of unitization orders on lease terms, the
remaining provisions of the unitization statute deserve only brief
notice. Amendments to orders are authorized "in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions as an original order," with one
important limitation. No change in the formula for allocating pro-
duction can be made without unanimous consent of operators and
royalty owners. There is an exception to this exception permit-
ting the chief, by order (subject to the procedural and substantive
requirements of other unitization orders) to enlarge the unit area.
When he does so, however, the original unit area is to be treated
as a single tract and production from the new unit is to be allo-
cated to such tract in gross, and then further allocated to the leases
in the original unit in accordance with the allocation formula of the
original order.8 3
The last paragraph of section 1509.29 negates the theory that
unitization is a product of cross-conveyances between all owners
of mineral rights in the pool. This theory has been used to explain
how, under voluntary pooling and unitization agreements, royalty
owners and operators share in production on land not owned by
them before the unit was formed. 4 A principal consequence of the
cross-conveyance theory is to require the joinder of all parties
owning interests in the unit as defendants in any suit to remove a
tract of land from the unit, the rationale being that all parties to
the agreement own an interest in the land to be removed and
would therefore be affected by an adverse judgment.8 , Other less
83 For a discussion of the problems raised by enlarging a unit and the effect
thereof on participation in production, see 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §
980.4 (1964).
84 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §§ 929-9292 (1964).
85 Id. § 929.1. See also id. §§ 928-928.5.
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important consequences have been attributed to the cross-convey-
ance doctrine."" The last paragraph of section 1509.28 provides:
Except to the extent that the parties affected so agree, no
order providing for unit operations shall be construed to result in
a transfer of all or any part of the title of any person to the oil
and gas rights in any tract in the unit area.
While the consequences of this enactment are nowhere stated
in the statute, the abolition of the cross-conveyance doctrine can
be attributed to a legislative intent to abolish some or all of the
consequences of the doctrine. For example, it can be argued that
since one important consequence of the cross-conveyance doctrine is
the joinder requirement, and since the legislature must have known
this when it took the trouble to deal with the doctrine, the joinder
requirement was abolished by the negation of the cross-conveyance
theory. Unfortunately, no positive rules on joinder are supplied by
the legislation. The act leaves it to the courts to work out joinder re-
quirements, albeit unembarrassed by the cross-conveyance doctrine.
Other consequences of the cross-conveyance theory are elim-
inated by the act itself, even without the express provision on the
subject. By fabricating a statutory scheme for unitizing mineral
properties through government order, the act sets at rest questions
arising over the applicability of the Statute of Frauds, the Record-
ing Act, and the Rule Against Perpetuities.
G. Effect on lease terms of compulsory pooling or unitization
When land under an oil and gas lease is pooled or unitized, the
question arises as to the effect of such integration on the terms
of the lease. Specifically, the questions are these: Does production
on the unit satisfy the thereafter clause of a lease on land included
in the unit? Do drilling operations satisfy the unless clause, the dry
hole clause, the drilling operations clause and other savings clauses?
Does payment of shut-in-gas royalty satisfy the shut-in-clause? Do
prudent drilling operations on the unit satisfy the implied covenants
of leases in the unit?
The answers to these questions depend, of course, on the pro-
visions of the pooling or unitization agreement if the integration
is voluntary, and upon the provisions of the statute or order if it
is mandatory. Most voluntary pooling and unitization agreements
provide that operations conducted anywhere on the unit and pro-
duction from any part of the unit are deemed to be operations and
production on any tract within the unit. Thus if Blackacre, a 160-
86 Ibid.
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acre tract of land owned by A and leased to B, is included in a
drilling unit or field-wide unit operations plan, production from
a well on Whiteacre, another tract of land in the unit, will satisfy
the habendum clause of the lease on Blackacre. When the primary
term of the lease on Blackacre expires, the requirements of the
"thereafter clause" are met by the unit production on Whiteacre
and the Blackacre lease is extended into the secondary term. Simi-
larly, under the typical agreement, operations on the unit are
deemed to be operations on Blackacre, so that the unless clause, the
dry hole clause, the drilling operations clause, the shut-in-gas-
royalty clause, and other such savings clauses in the Blackacre
lease are satisfied by operations on the unit.
An agreement that unit operations and production will satisfy
lease requirements on individual tracts is a perfectly understand-
able arrangement when the entire tract is included in the unit.
In such case the lessor has agreed to accept operations and pro-
duction on the unit as a substitute for operations and produc-
tion on his particular tract, in return for royalty on production
obtained anywhere on the unit-the lessor's share of royalty being
based on the inclusion of all of Blackacre in the unit. Thus, lessors'
participation in production may be based on surface acreage, value
of the land for mineral purposes, acre-feet of productive sand or
what have you; whatever the basis, all of Blackacre counts for
something in the production allocation formula, and hence unit
operations and production are sufficient to satisfy the lease terms as
to all of Blackacre.
Where, however, only part of Blackacre is included in the
unit, the above reasoning does not apply. The acreage excluded from
the unit is not a factor in the production allocation formula, and
the lessor gets no royalty for it. The question is presented whether
or not operations and production on the unit nevertheless satisfy
the lease terms as to the excluded acreage. Obviously, if in a vol-
untary arrangement the parties agree that the entire lease is pre-
served by unit operations, that is the end of the matter. Many
agreements, however, are imprecise on this point, forcing the ques-
tion to the courts for resolution.8 7
As the following discussion will reveal, the Ohio statute raises
the same problems of interpretation presented by many voluntary
agreements. Its provisions are clear enough when the entire lease-
hold is included in the pooling unit or the unitization area; the
statute is less clear when a portion of a leasehold is excluded from
87 A detailed discussion of this question appears in 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil
and Gas Law §§ 950-57 (1964).
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the unit. Since the provisions relating to pooling differ from those
relating to unitization, we will treat the two separately.
(1) Pooling.
The pooling section reads:
From and after the date of a pooling order, all operation,
including the commencement of drilling or the operating of a well
upon any tract or portion of the drilling unit, shall be deemed for
all purposes the conduct of such operations upon each tract or
portion thereof included in the drilling unit. That portion of the
production allocated to a separately owned tract included in a
drilling unit shall, when produced, be deemed, for all purposes, to
have been actually produced from such tract.88
Where all of a "tract" is within the unit, the statute clearly
provides that operations and production are attributed to the entire
tract. Thus the entire leasehold will be preserved by those opera-
tions on the unit that would preserve the lease if they were con-
ducted on the leasehold in the absence of mandatory pooling.
Where part of a leasehold is excluded from the unit, we inter-
pret the statute to attribute operations and production only to the
included acreage. Whether or not the lease is preserved on the
excluded acreage depends upon the conduct of operations and the
securing of production on such excluded acreage. The key words
of the statute in this respect are: "or portion thereof included in
the drilling unit." In effect the sentence says that operations con-
ducted anywhere on the unit are deemed, for all purposes, to have
been conducted upon each tract,-or (if less than all the tract is
included) upon that portion of each tract which is included in the
unit. So far the paragraph seems unambiguous to us.
The second sentence is less clear. Read literally, the sentence
simply doesn't speak to the situation of excluded acreage. It speaks
only of production allocated to a "tract," by statutory definition,
"a single, individually taxed parcel of land . . 89 Under the
allocation provision of the statute, which employs included acreage
as the exclusive basis for allocating unit production, no production
is allocated to a statutory "tract," but only to a portion of a tract.
If, therefore, the statutory definition of "tract" is discarded as
inapplicable to the interpretation of this section, it could be force-
fully argued that the quoted provision refers to production allocated
to that part of a leasehold included in the unit, since the reference
to "that portion of the production allocated to a... tract" invokes
88 Section 1509.27 (last paragraph).
89 Section 1509.01(J).
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the statutory provision allocating production on the basis of
included surface acreage. Thus it follows that the "deeming" pro-
vision attributes the production only to the included acreage, leav-
ing the habendum clause of the lease on the excluded acreage to be
satisfied by actual production thereon.
Moreover, the sentence itself speaks of production allocated
to a "separately owned tract included in a drilling unit .... ,"90
The italicized phrase appears to be a qualification on the word
"tract," even as defined in section 1509.01, and a qualification
completely consistent with the mode of allocating unit production
specified elsewhere in the statute. Lastly, construing the second
sentence of the paragraph to attribute production only to included
acreage makes it consistent with the first sentence, which clearly
attributes operations only to the included acreage. We concede,
however, that the second sentence (but not the first) can be
interpreted to reach the contrary result. The argument would be
that Blackacre, a 100-acre tract owned by A and leased to B, is a
statutory tract; that the inclusion of 50 acres of Blackacre in the
unit makes Blackacre "a separately owned tract included in a drill-
ing unit"; and hence the production is deemed "to have been actu-
ally produced from such tract," namely, from all of Blackacre. This
interpretation would, of course, attribute a different effect to opera-
tions from that attributed to production-a difficult distinction
to justify.
There is available to us no legislative history to help solve
this problem. The Armstrong Committee Report9 1 makes no men-
tion of it, and the draft version of the bill is identical in this respect
to the final version as enacted.
In construing the statute under these circumstances, it is
permissible to consider the policy arguments on each side in an
effort to discover the legislative choice. We believe that it is unfair
and unsound for a legislature to declare that forced pooling of part
of an oil and gas leasehold perpetuates the lease on the excluded
acreage. It is unfair to the lessor, for it ties up the excluded land
indefinitely without his consent and without his receiving any
benefit from the lease on such land. It is unsound because there
is no offsetting public gain. In fact the public interest is likely to
suffer, for the excluded acreage is kept off the market as long as
the unit well produces. The lessee may keep the lease without
exploration or development of the excluded acreage; no one else
can exploit the mineral potential of the land unless the lessee con-
90 Section 150927 (last paragraph). (Emphasis added.)
91 Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm'n Report of the Comm. to Study Oil & Gas
Laws in Ohio (1964).
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sents, and he has no compelling incentive to consent. In short, to
perpetuate the lease on the excluded acreage tends to inhibit the
full exploration and development of potentially productive prop-
erties, to the detriment of both the landowner and the public.
For these reasons we believe the Ohio courts would be fully
justified in finding that the last paragraph of section 1509.27 was
intended to attribute operations and production to included acreage
only and that such constructive operations and production preserve
the lease on included acreage and not on excluded acreage. Under
this interpretation of the statute, the lease is severed by the inclu-
sion of only part of the leasehold in the unit; perpetuation of the
lease on excluded acreage depends upon the terms of the lease and
the actions of the lessee upon that portion of the leasehold, just
as if pooling had never occurred, which, of course, it hasn't as to
excluded acreage.
A contrary construction of the statute is so adverse to the
interests of lessors that it is unfair (and perhaps violative of due
process) to deny them the opportunity to be heard on the contents
of the order and an opportunity to oppose promulgation of the order.
(2) Unit operations.
The relevant provision in the unitization section reads as
follows:
Oil and gas allocated to a separately owned tract shall be
deemed, for all purposes, to have been actually produced from such
tract, and all operations, including, but not limited to, the com-
mencement, drilling, or operation of a well upon any portion of
the unit area shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such
operations upon such separately owned tract in the unit area by
the several owners thereof. The operations conducted pursuant
to the order of the chief shall constitute a fulfillment of all the
express or implied obligations of each lease or contract covering
lands in the unit area to the extent that compliance with such
obligations cannot be had because of the order of the chief.92
The physical situation requiring construction of this provision
is the same as it is in the pooling cases: A unit area has been estab-
lished by order of the chief, and part but not all of Blackacre, which
is subject to an oil and gas lease, has been included in the unit area.
Where all of Blackacre is within the unit area the statute unequivo-
cally attributes operations and production to Blackacre, thus pre-
serving the lease on it.
While the wording of the unitization provision is different from
that of the pooling provision, the issue still turns on the meaning
92 Section 1509.28 (fourth-from-last paragraph).
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of the word "tract." The statutory definition in section 1509.01
seems to mean the entire leasehold, but the allocation provisions of
section 1509.28(A)(3) seem to mean only the included acreage.
The latter subsection directs the chief, in the absence of agreement,
to "determine the value ... of each separately owned tract in the
unit area," and to allocate production in the proportion that the
value of each tract bears to the total value of all tracts in the unit
area. It seems clear that the words "tract in the unit area" mean
that portion of the leasehold included within the unit, not the
entire leasehold. It follows that the phrase "tract in the unit area"
in the quoted paragraph means that portion of the leasehold in-
cluded within the unit area.
Moreover, the last sentence supports the proposition that the
lease is severed when only part of it is included within the unit
area, since performance of express and implied obligations is satis-
fied by unit operations only to the extent that the unitization order
precludes additional operations. Since the unitization order does not
affect that portion of the leasehold outside the unit, the lease terms
continue to govern the legal relationship of lessor and lessee as to
such excluded acreage.
Again we concede that the language of the statute will bear a
contrary interpretation and again we contend, for the reasons
already advanced, that the better result is to find a severance of
the lease.
H. Secondary recovery operations
Section 1509.21 provides that an operator
may apply to the chief of the division of oil and gas for a permit
to conduct secondary recovery operations using any method ap-
proved by the chief. Such permit shall be in addition to any
permit required by section 1509.05 [requiring drilling permits for
all wells] . . . Secondary recovery operations shall be con-
ducted in accordance with such rules, regulations or orders of the
chief as are necessary for protection of the public health and
safety or conservation of natural resources,
Two questions are presented immediately by the wording of
this section: (1) There being no statutory definition of "secondary
recovery operations," what is meant by this term? (2) Is an op-
erator required to obtain a permit to engage in secondary recovery,
thereby subjecting his plan of operation to the chief's approval, or
is the section merely permissive?
Secondary recovery has been defined as follows:
Broadly defined, this term includes all methods of oil extrac-
tion in which energy sources extrinsic to the reservoir are utilized
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in the extraction. One of the early methods was the application
of vacuum to the well, thus "sucking" more oil from the reservoir.
The term is usually defined somewhat more narrowly as a method
of recovery of hydrocarbons in which part of the energy employed
to move the hydrocarbons through the reservoir is applied from
extraneous sources by the injection of liquids or gases into the
reservoir. Typically a differentiation is made between secondary
recovery and pressure maintenance; the former involves an ap-
plication of fluid injection when a reservoir is approaching or has
reached the exhaustion of natural energy, while the latter involves
an application of fluid injection early in the productive life of a
reservoir when there has been little or no loss of natural reservoir
energy. The fluid (water, gas or air) is injected into the formation
through an input well and oil is removed from surrounding wells.
Air and gas injections may follow either one of two procedures.
In one, the air or gas is used to drive or flush the oil toward the
output wells. In the other method the reservoir is repressured and
during the pressure build-up period the flow from the output wells
must be restricted. Natural gas is used very frequently for re-
pressuring because it is very soluble in oil, thus increasing its
volume, decreasing its viscosity, reducing its surface tension, and
lightening its specific gravity-all desirable effects resulting in the
expenditure of less energy in producing oil. Air, on the other hand,
being only slightly soluble in crude oil, has little or no effect in
reducing viscosity and surface tension of the oil and may actually
oxidize some of the crude petroleum and aggravate corrosive
action on equipment. In the typical water-flood project, there is
an initial water-injection period of several months known as the
fill-up before additional oil is forced into the producing wells.
The end of this period is marked by a pick-up in oil production
which is followed by a rapid increase in oil recovery. Combined oil
and water production continues thereafter with the oil gradually
decreasing and the water increasing until the economical limit of
operations is reached. See Anderson, "Oil Production Methods,"
Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating Petroleum
Resources Pursuant to S. Res. 36, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 308
(June, 1945) ; Williams, "Problems in the Conservation of Gas,"
Second Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 295
(1956). See also Water flooding, Fluid injection.
The term "secondary recovery" has been defined by a sub-
committee of the American Petroleum Institute as "the oil, gas,
or oil and gas recovered by any method (artificial flowing or
pumping) that may be employed to produce them through the
joint use of two or more well bores. Secondary recovery is gener-
ally recognized as being that recovery which may be obtained by
the injection of liquids or gases into the reservoir for the purpose
of augmenting reservoir energy; usually, but not necessarily, this
is done after the primary-recovery phase has passed." American
Petroleum Institute, Secondary Recovery of Oil in the United
States 255 (1942).93
93 Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 358 (1964).
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Under this definition, a gas recycling operation, for example,
would not be subject to the section. Nor would a pressure mainte-
nance, salt-water disposal operation such as that in the East Texas
oil field. The latter, however, is subject to section 1509.22. Classifi-
cation of a particular operation as a statutory secondary recovery
operation makes virtually no difference if the section is permissive
only, and if it is mandatory, classification is important only in the
case of those operations that can be carried on without unitization,
for which a permit is needed in any event. As we shall see in the
following paragraphs, almost all operations that might be classified
as secondary recovery operations will usually require compulsory
unitization.
Regarding the question of the necessity of obtaining a permit,
the statutory language looks both ways. The clause, "may apply...
for a permit," sounds permissive. The phrase, "using any method
approved by the chief," sounds mandatory, for how can the
chief approve the method unless a permit is first sought and why
would a permit require approval if approval could be avoided by
simply not seeking a permit? The second sentence is compatible
with either interpretation. The third sentence points towards a
requirement of a permit but can be read the other way. If the third
sentence means, in effect, that no secondary recovery operation may
be conducted except upon the chief's approval, then, of course, the
first sentence permitting application for a permit is permissive only
in the sense that one can conduct secondary recovery operations
with a permit or not conduct them at all. If, on the other hand, the
third sentence merely grants the chief power to issue general rules
and regulations governing secondary recovery operations, the entire
section could be construed as permissive. An operator may apply for
a permit if he wishes to do so, but he is free to conduct secondary
recovery operations without a permit, so long is he abides by the
general rules and regulations applicable to all secondary recovery
operations. A drilling permit will be necessary, however, if the
recovery operation requires the drilling, deepening, or plugging back
of a well, because of section 1509.05.
The legislative history of section 1509.21 provides no help in
determining whether the section is mandatory or permissive. The
Armstrong Committee Report 94 does not mention secondary recov-
ery operations. The Staff Research Report 1r describes secondary
recovery operations generally but contains no discussion of, or
recommendation on, the necessity of a permit.
94 Supra note 91.
95 Staff Research Report at 29-32.
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Although the question is not free from doubt, we conclude that
the legislature intended to make the permit mandatory. To con-
strue the statute as permissive makes little sense, for under that
construction, with a permit one can carry on only those secondary
recovery operations approved by the chief but without a permit can
conduct any kind of operation he chooses. In opposition to this
interpretation, it might be argued that the section is permissive and
that the purpose of a permit is to provide a shield against federal
antitrust proceedings with the quid pro quo for obtaining such
protection being approval of the recovery method by the chief.
According to this theory, Ohio says that we will erect the bar-
rier of local public policy against antitrust actions if you get a
permit,9 but we will allow you to go ahead without a permit if
you wish, though you take the antitrust risk if you do so. This
analysis is unconvincing for it assumes that the antitrust danger
is significant and that the state permit minimizes the danger-both
very doubtful propositions. No antitrust proceedings have ever been
brought against operators who entered into a unit agreement for
secondary recovery operations, 97 and if such agreements are sub-
ject to the antitrust laws, it seems unlikely that the Ohio statute,
so construed, would provide a defense. Under a construction of the
statute as permissive, Ohio has not asserted a strong interest in
secondary recovery; it has merely said, you can do it any way you
wish without a permit, but you must do it our way with a permit.
We doubt that this is a sufficient assertion of state concern to
justify conduct otherwise illegal under the antitrust laws.98
More plausible to us is a construction of the section as man-
datory. The state has a legitimate conservation interest in all
secondary recovery operations. One method of operation might
96 Section 1509.41 provides: "No combination of persons or interests authorized
by any provisions of Chapter 1509. of the Revised Code shall be construed to be a
trust, monopoly, or other combination in restraint of trade prohibited by law." Such
a provision is commonplace in compulsory unitization statutes. See 6 Williams &
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 913.18 (1964).
97 The only federal antitrust proceeding brought against any unitized operation
was United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1, 77 F. Supp.
409 (W.D. La. 1948), affirmed, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). This was a gas recycling oper-
ation-not a secondary recovery operation- and the government's attack was directed
at what was alleged to be the joint processing, refining, and sale of the liquid con-
stituents in the wet gas at fixed prices through agreed-upon trade channels, which
allegedly eliminated competition. See Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization §
12.03 (Supp. 1965). See also Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, et al v. Unit Operation of
Oil or Gas Pools (2d ed. 1961).
98 To obtain protection under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), a stronger
state policy than this is probably necessary.
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recover as much as 80 per cent of the oil remaining in the ground
while another might recover only 20 per cent while rendering the
remainder either physically or economically unrecoverable. A legis-
lature could well decide to grant the conservation commission power
to forbid the less efficient operation.
Puzzling as section 1509.21 is that its interpretation may never
be subject to litigation. If the chief does not assert the necessity of a
permit, there is no one to complain. If the chief does assert the
need for a permit, few operators will be in a position to challenge
his ruling. If the secondary recovery plan requires the drilling,
deepening, or plugging back of any well, the operator must have a
permit under section 1509.05. The chief can make his views on the
method of secondary recovery known in acting on this application.
If the success of the operation depends upon subjecting a non-
consenting owner to a unit operations plan, the approval of the
chief is again necessary in order to obtain compulsory unitization
under section 1509.28. Only where the secondary recovery operation
can be conducted without any drilling and where all necessary
parties in interest have voluntarily joined the plan can an operator
afford to contend that he may proceed without the chief's approval.
And even here, the chief can probably thwart the operator by an
order issued under the third sentence of section 1509.21. In the
final analysis, then, it appears to us that state control of secondary
recovery operations in Ohio is squarely up to the Chief of the
Division of Oil and Gas.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE
Our examination of this topic will be brief as we lack familiarity
with Ohio administrative law. A few comments on the procedural
aspects of the new statute may nevertheless be appropriate. As
previously noted, the chief is given power to "make, adopt, repeal,
rescind, and amend... rules and regulations for the administration,
implementation, and enforcement of Chapter 1509. of the Revised
Code [the conservation act]." " The procedure for making rules
is set forth in chapter 119 of the Ohio Revised Code, which the
conservation act expressly makes applicable to the chief's rule-
making power. Apart from the procedural requirements of chapter
119, the conservation act itself prescribes some procedures to be
followed in respect to particular kinds of orders. Special field spac-
ing orders can be issued only after a hearing, and amendments
thereto also require a hearing. 00 Notice of an opportunity to be
heard must precede the issuance of a mandatory pooling order,
99 Section 1509.03.
100 Section 1509.25.
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although here a hearing is necessary only if requested. 10' Before any
proposed plan of unitization can become the subject of a compulsory
order, a hearing must be held on the plan. The chief can, upon his
own motion, initiate the hearing, and he must do so if persons
holding leases on 65 per cent of the land overlying a pool request
one.10 2 Amendments in a unitization plan also require hearings. 0 3
At least two methods of obtaining review of an order are
recognized by the conservation act. One route is to the Oil and Gas
Board of Review. Section 1509.36 provides that "any person claim-
ing to be aggrieved or adversely affected by an order by the chief
of the division of oil and gas may appeal to the oil and gas board
of review for an order vacating or modifying such order." The
filing of an appeal does not automatically stay execution of the
chief's order, but the board has discretion to order stays as it
deems appropriate.10 4 The board has power to subpoena witnesses
and records and to rule on the admissibility of evidence. The statute
apparently does not contemplate the board's review being limited
to the record made before the chief, for section 1509.36 provides
that "Either party ...may submit such evidences [sic] as the
board deems admissible." The standard of review prescribed by the
statute is "lawful and reasonable"; if the order meets the standard,
it is to be affirmed; "if the board finds that such order was unreason-
able or unlawful, it shall make a written order vacating the order
appealed from and making the order which it finds the chief should
have made." This procedure is uncommon, for most producing
states vest exclusive power to make and amend rules in the regula-
tory commission, without provision for an intermediate appeal
to an expert commission. In those states, agency orders are ordin-
arily reviewed solely by the courts, which by constitutional, legis-
lative, or self-imposed rule view their function as limited to
sustaining or overturning the questioned order but not revising it.1°
101 Section 1509.27.
102 Section 1509.28(A).
103 Section 1509.28(B).
104 Section 1509.36 (fifth paragraph).
105 See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373
P.2d 809, 18 0. & G.R. 69, (1962) ; Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357
S.W2d 364, 16 0. & G.R. 788, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962) ; Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801, 14 0. & G.R. 362 (1961). See
also Williams, "Nature and Effect of Conservation Orders: Their Finality, Modifica-
tion, Restriction on Production and Consequences of Violation-Duty of Lessees,"
Eighth Annual Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Inst. 433, 441-42 (1963).
It is worthwhile for Ohio lawyers to note that the statute before the court in the
Cdnlinental case, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-22(b) (1953), provided that: "the court
[shall on review of a commission order] . . . enter its order either affirming, modify-
ing, or vacating the order of the commission." The New Mexico Supreme Court held
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Orders of the board are final unless vacated by the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas in a proceeding to be discussed hereafter.
This description of the board's powers, its ability to amend and
revise conservation orders issued by the chief, the vague standard
of review (lawful and reasonable), and the finality of the board's
orders, indicates the importance the board could have in the admin-
istration of petroleum conservation in Ohio. Unfortunately, a board
that meets infrequently, only to hear appeals from agency orders,
and whose members receive only 20 dollars a day for their services,
is not likely to have the constructive influence on the conservation
regime that such an institution might have. The board may turn
out to be another example of a good idea killed by parsimony.
The board's position is further weakened by the last para-
graph of section 1509.36, which provides that appeals to the
board "do not constitute the exclusive procedure [that a com-
plainant] . . . must pursue in order to protect and preserve such
rights, nor do such sections [of the conservation act relating to
appeals to the board] constitute procedure which such person must
pursue before he may lawfully appeal to the courts . . ." We are
not well enough versed in Ohio administrative law to say what
other avenues of review this provision contemplates. But unless
other modes of appeal are disadvantageous in comparison with an
appeal to the board, it would seem, at least from this distance, that
this section further undermines the authority and utility of the
board.
When review by the board is the appeal route taken, the
board's orders are subject to review by the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas.106 This court's review is limited to the record
made before the board, except that additional evidence is admissible
if the court is satisfied that it is newly discovered and could not
with reasonable diligence have been ascertained before the board
hearing. The standard for determining the validity of the board's
orders is the same as that used by the board in passing on the
chief's orders---"lawful and reasonable." Moreover, the court seems
to be given the same power as the board has to amend or revise
the chief's orders. The last paragraph of section 1509.37 directs the
court, if it finds the board's order unreasonable or unlawful to
"make the order which it finds the board should have made." Since
the board is directed to make the order the chief should have made,
it seems to follow that the court can amend or revise the chief's
orders, thereby making the order that the board ought to have
that the attempt to delegate power to the courts to modify commission orders violated
the New Mexico Constitution.
106 Section 1509.37.
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found that the chief should have made.107 Appeals from the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas are governed by the ordinary rules
of procedure, there being no special provisions on the subject in the
conservation act.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
From time to time we have noted some shortcomings of the
new conservation act. It is perhaps appropriate, by way of a con-
clusion, to review some of these deficiencies briefly and systematic-
ally and to offer our suggestions for amendatory improvements in
the legislation. Our standard for judging the legislation is the ideal;
we readily concede that this Olympian detachment may be far
removed from the real world of Ohio politics. It may well be
claimed that the Ohio Legislature produced the best conservation
act that could be obtained under the circumstances; we are in no
position to judge that claim, but we do assert that the statute falls
short of providing full authority to achieve maximum conservation
of petroleum resources, that it fails to provide fully for protection
of correlative rights, and that the administration of the act could
have been made simpler and more effective.
Generally speaking, the deficiencies of the act fall into two
categories: (1) ambiguities are present in the statutory language
that will produce uncertainty in administration and unnecessary
litigation; and (2) substantive rules have been adopted that
derogate from sound conservation practice, and, correlatively, pro-
visions are lacking in the act that would accomplish a greater
degree of conservation and provide more protection for correlative
rights.
Falling into the category of ambiguous provisions that will cause
uncertainty of administration and unnecessary litigation are the
following:
1. The last paragraph of section 1509.25 by denying the chief
power to establish drilling units in accordance with a grid coordin-
ate system renders uncertain the basis on which the chief is to fix
spacing units for particular reservoirs. The act should be amended
to allow the chief to establish spacing units by reference to any
survey system he finds convenient. It seems unlikely that the chief
would abuse this discretion by departing from existing surveys
where they can be satisfactorily employed as the basis for a spacing
order, for to do so is to make unnecessary work for the division.
107 We mention again the question whether, under the Ohio Constitution, the
courts can be delegated such supervisory power over orders of administrative agencies.
See note 105 supra.
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2. Section 1509.26 should be amended to make clear the
position of lessors when lessees agree to pool voluntarily. As the
section now stands, it is uncertain whether or not royalty interests
are pooled by force of the statute when voluntary agreement is
reached by the operators. We see no objection to a rule that pools
royalty interests without the consent of their owners where produc-
tion is allocated on the basis of surface acreage and where pooling
does not affect leasehold acreage excluded from the unit. The act
can be read to reach this result and could properly be amended to
require it. But no harm is done by clarifying the section to reach
the opposite result, i.e., that voluntary pooling requires the consent
of lessors, since lessors can be forced into a compulsory unit under
section 1509.27.
3. The next-to-last paragraph of section 1509.27, dealing with
the sharing of drilling expenses and production when a pooling unit
is formed after a well has been drilled, lacks clarity. While we
believe the legislature intended for the division of production and
remaining unrecovered expenses to begin on the effective date of
the pooling order, there is some uncertainty on the matter. The act
should be amended to clearly provide for the rule stated above.
4. Section 1509.28(B) fails to make clear the method of
counting royalty owners' votes on a proposed compulsory unitiza-
tion order. We have contended that voting should be based on the
number of royalty acres owned by the voter. Although the legis-
lature probably intended this, the statute should be amended to
specify this procedure.
S. Both the pooling and unitization sections should be clarified
with respect to the effect of operations and production on oil and
gas leases on land excluded from the pooling unit or unitization
area. The statutory language points in the direction of severing
such leases, i.e., leaving the lease on the excluded acreage to be
satisfied by operations and production on such acreage. An amend-
ment specifying this result is needed.
6. Section 1509,21 should be amended to require a permit for
conducting secondary recovery operations: the granting of such
permit to be subject to the chief's approval of the method of
secondary recovery. As the section now stands, the necessity of a
permit is in some doubt, although the chief can probably reach most
secondary recovery operations through some other section of the
act.
Substantive deficiencies arising from inclusion of improper pro-
visions and omission of needed provisions include the following:
1. State-wide, and special field well-spacing orders ought to
be issued solely on the authority of the Chief of the Division of
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Oil and Gas, the veto power of the Technical Advisory Council
should be abolished, and the statute should specify the standard
for well-spacing to be the area that can be efficiently drained by
one well. Optimum allocation of resources demands the elimination
of unnecessary drilling. This is more likely to be accomplished if an
impartial, expert administrative agency is given exclusive power to
establish spacing units in accordance with the standard of efficient
drainage.
2. Sections 1509.24 and 1509.25, relating to well-spacing
orders, should be amended to broaden the purposes for which such
orders may be entered. Section 1509.24 now limits the purposes of
state-wide spacing orders to those "of conserving oil and gas reserves
and [protecting] the safety of persons ... ." An added purpose
should be the prevention of unnecessary drilling. Similarly section
1509.25 permits a variation of the state-wide spacing pattern in
particular fields only if the chief finds that the variation is "reason-
ably necessary to protect correlative rights or to provide effective
development, use or conservation of oil and gas . . . ." This unduly
limits the chief's power to vary spacing patterns from field to field.
As stated above, the appropriate standard for fixing spacing units
should be the area that can be efficiently drained by one well. The
chief should have power to fix the spacing pattern for each field on
the basis of this standard, without regard to the statewide pattern.
Again, this purpose could be accomplished by giving the chief
power to issue field well-spacing orders to prevent the drilling of
unnecessary wells.
3. Corresponding changes should be made in section 1509.28,
which authorizes compulsory unitization only if the operation "is
reasonably necessary to increase substantially the ultimate recovery
of oil and gas . . . ." Compulsory unitization can contribute sig-
nificantly to the optimization of resource allocation by reducing the
number of wells necessary to drain the reservoir through scientific
location of those wells that are drilled. The statute should authorize
the use of compulsory unitization for this purpose.
4. The last paragraph of section 1509.20, which denies the
chief power to prevent the flaring of casinghead gas when "there is
no economic market at the well for the escaping gas," should be
repealed. The chief should have the discretionary power to en-
courage pipeline connections to wells producing casinghead gas.
5. As a corollary to (4), and for other purposes as well, the
chief should be given general rule-making power to prevent waste,
as defined in section 1509.01.
6. The non-consent penalty of section 1509.27 should be made
discretionary with the chief, and additional options should be made
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available to the non-consenting operator at the chief's discretion.
Broad flexibility in solving the problem of nonparticipating operators
could be achieved by granting the chief authority to order, as
warranted by the circumstances, a nonparticipating operator to
transfer his lease to the unit operator upon terms set by the chief,
based upon the market value of the lease, or to pay out of pro-
duction a. non-consent penalty as fixed by the chief on the basis of
the risk undertaken by the unit operator in drilling the unit well.
Similar provisions should be added to the unitization section
if its provisions should be broadened to include undeveloped fields.
7. Section 1509.40 should be repealed and a new section en-
acted that prohibits curtailing production on the basis of market
demand. If this is done and if the chief is given general rule-making
power to prevent waste, there would be clear authority to regulate
gas-oil and water-oil ratios to prevent dissipation of reservoir energy.
Such power is somewhat in doubt at the present time.
8. In connection with the repeal of section 1509.40 and the
substitution of an anti-market demand statute, there should be
enacted ratable-take and common-purchaser statutes applicable to
both oil and gas. These statutes are designed to protect correlative
rights by preventing producers with a market from draining neigh-
bors with a smaller market or with no market at all. Common-
purchaser statutes accomplish the same objective by prohibiting
discrimination among producers by purchasers.108 The problem is
ordinarily more serious with gas than with oil but standby authority
should be available even for oil. The ability to prosecute discrim-
inatory purchasers of oil may be enough to induce ratable purchase.
Regarding gas, achieving ratable production is complicated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Northern Natural Gas.10 9 Neverthe-
less, for gas not subject to Federal Power Commission jurisdiction,
common-purchaser statutes are still enforcible, and unless the Court
extends Northern Natural Gas, ratable-take orders applicable to
jurisdictional gas but directed at producers only are valid.
In summary, Ohio has made a satisfactory beginning effort to
conserve petroleum resources and to protect correlative rights in
petroleum reservoirs. The statute has deficiencies in both form and
substance, and the correction of these should engage the legislature's
attention in the coming years.
108 Ratable-take and common-purchaser statutes and regulations are discussed in
Stayton, "Proration of Gas," Fourteenth Annual Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and
Taxation, Southwestern Legal Foundation 1 (1963).
109 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963). The
operation of ratable-take and common-purchaser orders in preventing net noncompen-
sated drainage, the effect of the decision on such orders, and some of the implications
of the opinion are discussed in Meyers, "Federal Preemption and State Conservation
in Northern Natural Gas," 77 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1964).
